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Risk and Competition in the Indonesian Private Banking Market: An 
Asymmetric Rivalry Within and Between Strategic Groups 
 
 





This paper tests the interrelationships among risk, competition, and efficiency in the Indonesian 
private banking industry between 2014 and 2018. We examines asymmetric rivalry within and 
between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, 
owing to several forms of group-level effects, including price difference and efficiency, strategic 
groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within 
their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. The competition of 
private banking is dominated by incumbent firm. The risk and efficiency evolved over time enjoyed 
by incumbent with fat cat taxonomy and quiet life hypothesis. The entrant play lean and hungry 
strategy in different market segment within strategic group, whereas foreign bank deter incumbent 
with higher prices to enter between strategic group. The competition of private banking in 
Indonesia dominated by risk appetite and fragmented market.  
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Since global economic crises in 2008, wealth and private banking is one of the fastest growing 
segments on banking, in particularly for the emerging economy (Bryane, et al., 2015). Mishra and 
Meyer (2019) reports that high net-worth individual (HNWI) in emerging economy is outstanding. 
The HNWI household estimated at 3.68 million with about 12.0 trillion in the Asia-Pacific region. 
According to Asia Pacific Wealth Report 2012, Indonesia was a fastest HNW client’s growth rate 
(24.7%) than other Asian countries.  
 
If we compare to the world private banking system such as in developed countries, private banking 
system in Asia has different perspective especially in competition aspect. Mishra and Meyer (2019) 
noted that wealth manager in Asia typically focus on top line revenue increases rather than an 
advisory relationship. Usually, the wealth manager less stick to compliance and risk management 
practice that led to increasing cost of doing business. According to Santacruz (2018) the 
competition for managing the assets in Asia-Pacific HNWIs is becoming increasingly crowded. In 
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fact, The Asia’s traditional banking center such as Singapore and Hong Kong is under competition 
from emerging Asian centers such as Shanghai (China) and Jakarta (Indonesia). 
 
As the fastest growth of HNW client and emerging Asian wealth market, Indonesia have benefited 
from its domestic market (Santacruz, 2018). Although private wealth management has not been a 
major financial activity, local banks and wealth managers are encourage HNWIs to get wealth 
management services.  Along with increasing of rich population and middle income class, emerging 
of HNWIs have created a new demand on stronger wealth management market.  
 
Private banking services in Indonesia usually serve for high net worth household with their 
minimum deposit between US$ 35.000 – US$ 70.0006.  The private banking sectors in Indonesia has 
been emerge as a new market segment. Along with its consistence pace of economic growth, the 
private banking sectors become potential market for both domestic or foreign investor  to enter in 
this market segments.  
 
According to Mishra and Meyer (2019) and Santacruz (2018) the competition of private banking 
system in Asian market shaped of a higher appetite for risk, fragmented market, intergenerational 
transfer and greater awareness of private banking.  Otherwise, in traditional system or private 
banking likes Switzerland system, developed through strong bank-client relationship over 
generation and focus on capital preservation rather than wealth accumulation. It is confirmed in 
recent study shows that greater market power fueled by higher economic growth like Asian 
countries  tends to temper risk taking incentives (Soedarmono et al., 2013). 
 
This paper intend to investigates more deeper the connection between risk and competition of 
private bank sector in emerging markets such as Indonesia. How customer attracted to deposit 
their money in private banking services based upon the profile of bank. According to Leland and 
Pyle (1977) the willingness to invest of deposit customer through signal of lending market. When 
customer has good signal that bank has a value on the project that reflect the information transfer 
by the price of output (i.e. deposit interest rate and/or lending interest rate). The customer will 
attract to deposit their money.  
  
In private banking sector, for both deposit and lending performance  is a credible signal for 
depositors for preserving of their capital and insuring the safety of their deposit. On the other hand, 
in moral hazard of banking industries, this information is restricted. The gap information between 
customer and bank performance has led the market in different properties of market equilibrium. 
These differences caused by different deliverance of information either with no information, with 
or costless information. Unless,  we assess the signaling of equilibria of the industry in market 
through efficiency (Leland and Pyle, 1977).  
 
In addition, Thakor (1996) emphasized that the asymmetric information of bank lending gives 
uninsured  depositors to monitor loan quality and to price of its risk. When the bank be able to 
manage its risk signal. It reduces the cost of protecting capital, increasing of assets quality and 
generating higher expected return (Hughes and Mester, 1998). In fact, according to Burgstaller and 
Cocca, (2011) in private banking market, the risk and return factor is not merely driving force of 
competition factor. In addition, efficiency and switching cost are the crucial variable for deposit 
bank to locked-in the depositor (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2011). Más-Ruiz et al., (2014) also support 
that elaborating efficiency and switching cost as a retaliation among strategic group play 
importance role to determined degree of strategic interaction of banks.  
 
6 Survey was conducted in 2019 for private banking services across 102 banks.  
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There is a remain unexplored study for private banking that linkages between risk and competition 
in Asian market especially in Indonesia. We conduct the competition approach with conjectural 
variation.  This approach quantitatively assessed the persistence of competitive interaction model 
between strategic firms and its heterogeneity factors. This approach has been called as New 
Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) frameworks (Dranove et al., (1998),  Peteraf and Shanley 
(1997), Bresnahan (1992).  
 
There is still limited empirical evidence for predicting private banking market interaction with the 
nature of competition with conjectural variation approach. To best of our knowledge, assessing 
competition with conjectural variation method to assess  strategic rivalry with asymmetric 
competition approach in private banking has not been conducted by previous studies. Most of 
empirical evidence for private banking literature, were conducted by literature review and 
qualitative analysis without strong quantitative assessment such as Briyane et al., (2015), Mishra 
and Meyer (2019), and Walter and Sisli, (2007). In addition, there is still limited references for 
single country analysis about private banking competition. Although some author such as Ting, 
(2017) study about factors affecting wealth management services in Taiwan. The study does not 
assess the competition aspect of wealth management services.  
 
 
2. Literature Reviews 
 
We embarked the linkage between competition in private banking according to Boyd and Nicolo 
(2005). He stated that when the competition intense in loan market, bank will decrease the deposit 
interest rate that affect on situation that is close to default. Increasing in competition will increase 
their risk taking, unless they manage their risk through efficiency.   
 
Maudos and de Guevara (2007) classified market power and efficiency based upon efficient 
structure efficiency hypothesis, that the most efficient banks obtain both greater profitability and 
markets shares as a consequence the market becomes more concentrated (Demsetz, 1973). 
Another hypothesis says that  market share capture by factor unrelated to efficiency such as market 
power and product differentiation  (Shepherd, 1986). In addition, as a special case of market power 
hypothesis such as quiet life hypothesis stated that, when bank has higher market power, the lower 
effort of managers to maximize operating efficiency. If we connect the competition, risk, and 
efficiency in private banking, the efficient in scale of operation is a crucial factor. Specialization and 
investment performance as an important factor that bank become more efficient (Burgstaller and 




According to Shaffer and Spierdijk (2017) there are six indicators that measures a market power. 
The pivotal aspect to measure competitive benchmarks is marginal cost of production that compare 
to output price, the effect of price and quantities that sold on customer and elasticity of demand by 
the consumers. Among those indicators, we focus on Rothschild - Bresnahan conduct parameters 
(conjectural variations parameters) that explicitly performed oligopoly equilibrium concept.  
 
We defined that competition of private banking in Indonesia is in oligopoly equilibrium. The reason 
why we choose this assumption because market concentration of private banking services in 
Indonesia dominated by several banks with larger assets, corporate governance ownership, and 
specific market segment (local and sharia bank).  In addition, the private banking services is new 
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growing activity of bank along with other main activities. In order to attract private bank 
customers, the first signal that bank should offer is basic information of their entire activity to 
customer that usually provides through public disclosure such as income statement and balance 
sheet.  
 
Therefore, applying conjectural analysis for private banking in Indonesia is adequate for capturing 
behavior of banks to attract consumers. This approach can mapped direct to explicitly oligopoly 
equilibrium concept in both static and dynamic models. Its portray structure of bank market power 
on the input side as well as the output side. The approach can decomposed into bank industry from 
upstream and downstream components with rigorous theoretical underpin and clear economic 
interpretation (Shaffer and Spierdijk, 2017). On the other hand, this approach has been well known 
with operational complexities and difficult to estimate.  
 
The conjectural analysis heavily rely on econometric estimation that  conduct in following steps; (1) 
estimating marginal cost as a basic estimation that incorporate into conjectural equation, and (2) 
estimation of conjectural equation where the analysis incorporate marginal cost, price estimation 
as well as demand estimation in the model. Whilst, strategic interaction is estimated through 
conjectural parameters that reflect on interaction quantities / prices between banks. There are 
several research that conduct this approach such as Mas-ruiz et al., (2014) for banking sectors in 
Spain, Shaffer (2004) for banking sectors in United States, and Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) for 
banking sector in Japan.  Most of those studies were conducted with econometric estimation and 
depict the linkage Cournot duopoly for banks with Rothschild – Bresnahan Index (conjectural 
equation).  
 
The Rothschild – Bresnahan Index calculated as the following formula 
 
(1) 𝐶𝑉𝐼 = (𝑃−𝑀𝐶𝑃 ) ⋅ 𝜂   
 
Where CVI is conjectural variation index; P is price of bank output, MC is marginal cost of bank, 𝜂 is 
elasticity of demand 𝜂 = −𝐷 ⋅ 𝑃/𝑄. Where Q is quantity of bank output. Several studies (Mas-ruiz et 
al., (2014), Shaffer (2004)) proxies P as price of lending interest rate or price of deposit interest 
rate of bank to the consumers. Q is quantity of demand that proxies as outstanding balance of bank 
activity. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) defined Q as outstanding balance of loan for bank,  Shaffer 
(2004)defined Q with quarterly revenue,  Mas-ruiz et al., (2014) defined Q with total value of either 
loans  or deposit.  
 
Walter and Sisli (2007) emphasized that private banking industry is strongly related to assets 
management services. Creating value chain through cross link services by establishing cost effective 
distribution of assets management services by various kind of remote marketing technique. The 
bank should provides strong infrastructure and other financial intermediaries like insurance 
companies, mutual fund supermarket and financial management consultant. These endeavors 
proposes by bank to lock-in the depositors in order to keep the service and sustain their market 
power (Carbo-Valverde et al., (2011).  
 
In order to compete in their strategic group, the bank attract depositors as new customer or shift 
from other customer to be their customer (Hughes and Mester, 1998; Leland and Pyle, 1977). If we 
follow new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) framework. The private banking competition 
should measured through market conduct and unknown cost parameters. The market sensitivity 
measured  by responsive of price to change  in demand elasticities. We considered that our study 
 5 
from the consumer perspective rather than producers perspective, the consumer expectation of 
their investment should be elaborated in the model. In consumer perspectives, the price shaped by 
symmetric firm that retaliate between private banks. Hence, the price of private bank output 
defined as the difference between bank-i and bank-j (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007).  
 
Accordingly, in order to measure the competition of private banking in Indonesia the structural 
model that formed conjectural equation should be incorporated the price difference between 
banks. The conjectural equation should incorporate structural function such as marginal cost, 
supply and demand function. On the other hand, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2017) highlighted that 
estimating this structural model requires estimation of a system of equation that is non linear. On 
the other hand, most of the studies were conducted with simultaneous linear estimation such as 2 
Stage Least Square (2SLS), and 3 Stage Least Square (3SLS). There are some urgent note that should 
be check within the estimation especially marginal cost should be properly specified and 
theoretically valid when the marginal cost function are exactly linear an close to zero.  
 
 
2.1.1. Strategic Group Rivalry 
The competition will occur within their closest competitor that have similar endowment factors. 
The endowment factor depend upon various resource input that bank can compete with others. 
Accordingly, this resource input will shaped bank to compete with specific market segment or other 
factors. When bank have similar endowment and market segment, they will evolve and promote 
their competition within their factors. The similar endowment and market segment creates 
strategic group rivalry. Porter (1979) called this situation as strategic group rivalry.  On the other 
hand, along with dynamic structure of bank, the competition shaped their action into strategic 
rivalry to survive in the market. During this competition process, in order to survive bank act 
strategically by improving their value creation and creates new groups into better group or lesser 
group. Along with process this group is mobile, if the bank in the lesser can improve their 
performance to jump into better group, whereas in better group unable to sustained and shift to 
lesser group. This mobility process of between group process according called as intra group 
(Peteraf ,1993; Caves and Porter, 1977)  The shifting from lesser level into better level of group rivalry as new market segment. It’s called as between group rivalry.  
 
The formation of strategic group in market concentration perspectives determined by resource 
input and managerial performance to dominate in the market. In order to   
 
In terms of competition assessment through strategic groups rivalry, the theoretical basis prior to 
strategic group interaction have demonstrated by Más-Ruiz et al., (2014), Más-Ruiz et al. (2011), 
Más-Ruiz et al., (2005). We employ they procedure to identify whether private banking sector is 
formed based upon the emergence of private banking groups, intra- and intergroup rivalry, 
performance differences between group and stability of group structure.   
 
In order to defined clearly about group classification to distinguished the terms of within and 
between group in this paper. We define that within strategic group as a strategic group that have 
similar resource such as financial performance, risk, and other factors. This performance will 
shaped its specific group naturally according to their assets, profit, customer, risk, efficiency and so 
on. The between strategic group is the group outside within group that could be higher or lowered 
performance than within strategic group. This group shaped according to their performance that 
distinguished from within group.    
 
 6 
These factors will determined whether the group within or between are getting closer or distance, 
or even jumped to another group. Along with these strategic action, Más-Ruiz et al., (2014) offer 
systematic and predictable approach to investigates asymmetric of within (intra) and between 
(inter) group rivalry in private banking industry.  
 
 
The emergence of strategic group. Increasing demand of private banking sectors in developing 
countries triggered by (a) education planning and borrowing allow for greater family earning 
power; (b) wealth managers can offer premium clients higher-return investment; (c) larger role for 
retirement savings and estate planning; (d) large role for life, health, and disability insurance; (e) 
offer of small and medium business accounts to complement wealth management accounts; (f) 
prospecting for wealth families increases portfolio and client size (Bryane et al., 2015).  
 
These aspects have stimulated private bankers and wealth managers in developing countries 
provides efficient institutions and freedom of the rule of law for the customer to deliver quality of 
services offered in terms of cost, return on assets, return on equity, cost income ratios will impact 
on volume and value of private banking clients.  
 
In term of supply Mishra and Meyer, (2019) report that the emergence of private banking in Asian 
countries stimulated by (a) entrepreneurial activities; (b) clients have a perception that the wealth 
management industry can add to the wealth accumulation; client expect the wealth management 
will grow their wealth rather than preserve it; (c) there is an intense competition between wealth 
managers that focus short term results rather than advisory relationship that usually require in 
long term relationship. In fact they underline that wealth manager in Asia less experience rather 
than in traditional Switzerland system that usually embed with mature talent in wealth 
management; (d) the private banking sector in developing countries is not stick to compliance and 
risk management practices with international standard that stimulates higher cost of doing 
business.  
 
If we looking at those studies, the emergence of strategic group of private bank in the emerging 
economies based upon their performance and elaborating their risk due to entrepreneurial 
activities. The private banks depends on their efficient institution and quality of services as well as 
their strategic interaction with their closer competitor. This performance not only that shaped its 
market segment but also as a barrier of between group to enter within market segment group. The 
ability of bank to sustained and enter this group will rely on strategic action to imitate or followers 
(Dranove et al., 1998). In NEIO framework, analyzing  this inference of market power can be 
predicted by estimating of behavioral equation by which bank set price and quantity as well as their 
factors to dominate in the market. The retaliation between banks should predict the strategic 
interaction at the industry level. How their performance differences closely related to markets 
power (Bresnahan, 1989).  
 
We hypothesized that the emergence of private banking in Indonesia shaped by actual behavior 
relation and interaction of Indonesian banking performance. This emergence portrayed the 
interaction of the bank according to bank size, risk and return performance that deterring its 
strategic group as a mobility barrier from outside group of bank. We classified that private banking 
in Indonesia distinguished into four classification as noted by Mishra and Meyer (2019) such as 
universal bank, local bank, foreign bank, and particular bank that has been emerge in Indonesia as 
the largest of muslim population in the world that is sharia bank.  
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The rivalry within and between strategic groups.  The anatomy of competition between firms 
consist of rivalry between firms or group. According to Smith et al. (1997) the fundamental 
question of determining rivalry is not to compare the rivalry within or between group. The 
competitive responses cannot be predicted by strategic group membership. Otherwise, strategic 
group membership is a predictor by which firms compete with one another and how they 
undertake competitive actions, cut prices, instigate warfare and imitate rivals.  
 
Peteraf (1993) distinguished the strategic group into within/between group hypothesis that rivalry 
occur according to within and between group.  
 
• The within group argument stated by Porter (1979) that industry composed into cluster or 
groups of firms with similar strategies called as firms within group. This within firm 
behavior have group resemble one another, recognize their mutual dependence closely, and 
to be able to anticipate each other reaction accurately.  
• Otherwise, between strategic group the situation is difference.  
According to Beck and Levine (2008) the presence of firm to stay within this strategic group 
determined by two ways that is  
a) First , creating barrier to entry within strategic groups by improving the capability of outside 
firm to entry into this group depend upon as follows (i) bank characteristics i.e. larger total 
assets, economic scale and efficiency; (ii) contractual and informational framework i.e. the 
ability to reduce asymmetric information and adverse selection of effective contractual and 
information frameworks, (iii) market structure i.e. bank concentration system that led to 
market power or ownership type can determined market structure of private banking, (iv) 
regulatory restriction on bank activities and entry i.e. the degree of regulation on financial 
market and the presence of stated owned banks as well as fraction of bank application 
denied, (v) transparency i.e. the disclosure information that client have more access to 
information and (vi) physical infrastructure i.e. information and technology that associated 
with cost of doing business for banks to serve their client.  
b) The second barrier is the presence of multiple strategic groups affect on process of 
competitive rivalry. In this barriers, the firm with superior bargaining power will 
determined the competitive structure within group. These factors are not only determinant 
of firm enter within strategic firm, but concomitantly as general barrier of bank to entry in 
difference level of market in which they operate and competitive pressure they face (Beck 
and De La Torre, 2007). 
 
The  degree rivalry between groups are greater than rivalry within groups (Porter and Caves, 
2010). Mas-ruiz et al. , (2014) find that competitive interaction within and between strategic group 
of loan market in Spain are both asymmetric and the dominant fringe type. The large firm expect to 
experience strong reprisals from other firm in other group and no reaction from the medium firm 
and the small firms.  
 
We hypothesized that rivalry within and between strategic group in private banking are not far and 
much closer with Spain case. The medium, local and foreign bank in Indonesia unable to retaliate 
with universal bank. They tend to imitate and follows these banks because the larger group more 
determinant on the market power, and attempting to differentiate market segment to avoid 
competition with incumbent bank market segment. There is a dominant fringe type of  asymmetric 
rivalry on private banking as noted by Dranove et al., (1998).  
 
Performance difference between group. As we noted earlier that performance is a crucial factor 
for strategic group to stimulate their rivalry as a retaliation instruments to compete between firms. 
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When a firm has better performance than others for managing their risk, return, and efficiency. The 
firm creates its own barriers by covering the cost to achieve that performance (Dolnicar et al., 
2018). These factors will creates rigidities for a bank to stay in market segment and barrier for 
other to enter the market. The strategic group produces relative cost of advantage over other firms 
and group (Porter, 1979). According to this characteristic, group creates its barrier that produces 
market power, efficiency and risk called as mobility barrier (Dranove et al., 1998).  
 
The sustainability of firm to stay within or between group determined by their strategic interaction 
to manage their performance. If one firm unable to retaliate with other firm within group, they will 
open other firm to entry or replace its own position. Therefore, the retaliation of firm to others or 
vice versa is always a learning process for firms to be a persistent member or temporary member in 
the market (McGee and Thomas, 1986). This process portrayed through price interaction of firm 
with others either the group attempt to deterring competitor to gain entry into group or enhancing 
strategic among members  (Mas-ruiz et al. 2014).  
 
We can argue that private banking in Indonesia will follow the proposition of cost efficiency among 
strategic group and focus on delivering value added product to differentiate their value and 
transparence around the product pricing  to link between fees, risk and performance.  
 
Stability of group structure.  After we discussed the strategic group behavior since the 
emergence, how the rivalry behavior within and between as well as performance impact on rivalry 
behavior. At this moment we are going to discuss about how the strategic group can sustained and 
stabilized in dynamic structure. The strategic group is change over time, it is grow, evolve, and 
decline (Hatten and Hatten, 1987). This dynamic structure affected by their member along with 
their strategic interaction behavior. The response of firms within their group, create collective 
strategies due to homogeneity behavior in their strategic group. This homogeneity will interrupted 
by periods of change then reshape the formation of strategic group (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 
1993). Basically, the group structure is unstable due to their response from the environment. The 
environment will push the firms to change their strategic behavior and adopt the collective 
strategies among its group members (Mas-ruiz et al., 2014).  
 
The firm should change their strategies because they should response on imitation action of other 
firms by copying their behavior, and realigning their position within their market power due to 
external environment (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1993). It is hard for firm to keep their structure 
static without coping strategy with dynamic industrial environment. This dynamic process includes 
the strategic action of firms to deal with their performance, price difference , risk and efficiency.  
 
We hypothesized that dynamic group structure of private banking in Indonesia formed by its 
dynamic effect of price difference, risk and efficiency. These factors stimulates bank to adapt and 
coping their strategies along with external factors such as macro economic condition or other 
environmental industry factor (Bryane et al., 2015). The strategic group are interactively cope 




2.1.2. Asymmetric Rivalry Within and Between Group 
According to Hatten and Hatten (1987) the barrier to mobility between groups called as 
asymmetric, this occur when the cost of imitation are high and efficiency or managing risk are 
superior within strategic group. These parameters called as barriers of other firm to entry within 
group. The asymmetric rivalry behavior can be defined as a function of which competitor of banks 
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unable to imitate strategic action symmetrically with other banks. This asymmetric competition 
based on strategic difference of bank performance to cope strategic behavior with their competitor 
in term of price difference, efficiency, risk, and return.  
 
In fact, Porter, (1979) defined that rivalry is not symmetric but rather is asymmetric that portrayed 
strategy differences where preferences, information flow and relative power among firm is 
asymmetric. The impact of rivalry on a firm will determined their resources i.e. number and size 
distribution, strategic distance between group and market interdependence among group to 
retaliate other players. How the present bank in Indonesia competing for same private banking 
customer rather than customer in distinctly market segment. The diversity strategies for each 
banks to attract private bank services will enhance rivalry among bank.  
 
Desarbo and Grewal (2008) added, that competition among firms also hybrid, firms within strategic 
groups generally adopt similar strategic recipes and compete more intensely than firms across 
strategic groups. They find that hybrid strategic group outperforms ordinary clusters analyses and 
offer critical insights into the nature of competition among firms.   
 
If we linkage the asymmetric rivalry concept with the evolving of strategic group rivalry. The 
asymmetric rivalry is an instrument for strategic action for the firm to maintain its dynamic 
structure in the market. In order to illustrates this evolving process and how the strategic action 
operate in private bank sector we can employ response for each firm in each strategic group 
members according to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).  At the first period, while market dominated 
by the incumbent based upon their performance such as risk, return, or efficiency. How these 
dimensions work, by employing Cournot-Nash equilibrium that entrant will deter the incumbent 
according to their price. In the first period, the incumbent of private banking completely dominate 
the market whereas entrant unable to produce revenue.  In order to deter incumbent in various 
strategic group, the entrant lowered their price by applying adoption, imitation of incumbent 
behavior to be more efficient or take risk appetite to enter the market. The behavior of incumbent 
to rebuttal this action, depend on their investment expenditure on reaction curve. The reaction 
curve rely on incumbent investment whether  they behave will be upward or downward slope 
against the entrant.  
 
The upward slopes in reaction curve indicates that firms (incumbent firms) reduces its market 
share due to entrant, whereas downward slopes represent increasing market share of incumbent 
firm than the entrant. There are many strategies if incumbent to maintain their market. There are 
important assumption according to these taxonomy, that the taxonomy exist in the second period 
reaction and investment is the pivotal factors that incumbent whether accommodate or deter the 
entry. We use these strategies to applied in private banking in the following ways: 
1. If the incumbent firm has  reaction curve with upward slope, the following action that 
incumbent should do that is whether incumbent should tough or soft; in order to make 
tough or soft its depend on investment  of incumbent to accommodate or deter the entry. If 
the incumbent  
a. tough due to their overinvestment as shown by its performance (i.e. deposit rate, 
return on assets, return on equity, credit risk, price difference, efficiency,  insolvency 
risk, liquidity risk, etc.) so the act of incumbent to deter entry in the market should 
be Top Dog.  Which means, the entrant should compete head to head in terms of its 
performance with incumbent. Otherwise, the incumbent is underinvestment 
strategy in tough cases because incumbent expecting the entrant due to limited 
capacity for providing service in the market its called as Puppy Dog strategy 
(Gelman and Salop, 1983). We hypothesizes that tough case with puppy dog 
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strategy will be exist in case of private banking in Indonesia especially at the rivalry 
between group. Along with high economic growth and fastest growth on HNWI’s 
and limitation of national banking for private banking services. The 
underinvestment of incumbent and existing regulation accommodate entry in the  
market whether local or foreign bank to deliver services. As noted earlier by Mishra 
and Meyer (2019) that the risk appetite and market potential  in emerging 
economies will attract private bank to enter this potential segment, whereas most of 
existing bank has limited on private banking.   
b. Otherwise, for soft case if the incumbent has overinvestment strategy, they will act 
as a Fat Cat to accommodate the entry. The fat cat strategy is incumbent to play less 
aggressively in post entry, because they believe with their investment such as in 
advertising or technologies that push their rivals become less aggressive. On the 
other hands, another soft case strategy in called as Lean and Hungry (Gilbert, 1989). 
The incumbent is in underinvestment strategy to be tougher in order to prevent 
entry calls. We consider that Fat Cat strategy is exist in Indonesia private banking 
when incumbent banking (i.e. larger firm size) such as universal banking face up to 
local bank and foreign bank, it indicates most of universal bank dominates by the 
corporate government bank in terms of output, assets and customer.   
2. If the incumbent has reaction curve  with downward slope which means that incumbent in 
the second period has increased its market share. When incumbent face this situation, they 
will accommodate entry for entrant either tough or soft  by applying investment that 
followed by entrant with similar or adoption strategy.   
a. The incumbent is tough if they overinvestment  than entrant and act as top dog. The 
incumbent has strong performance. They are efficient, well performed in managing 
risk, highly price difference, and good in return. This strategic act will deter the 
entrant unless they adopt incumbent performance as a top dog; 
b. On the contrary, the incumbent is soft when they underinvestment  than entrant and 
act like lean and hungry. Consequently, this strategies trigger the entrant to follow 
this strategy in order to accommodate the entry.   
 
As matter of fact, for downward conditions, we hypothesized that the private banking sector in 
Indonesia it seems exist especially for universal bank whilst local bank imitate and adopt their 
strategies to accommodate entry. The local bank or medium size bank will adopt the larger size 
bank. On the other hand, the top dog strategies will exist especially between national bank and 
foreign bank.  
 
2.2. Risk and Efficiency 
Fiordelisi et al., (2011) and Berger and DeYoung (1997) classified hypothesis that linkage between 
risk and efficiency consist of  (i) bad management hypothesis where bank operates with low level of 
efficiency but improving their revenue. They will take more credit risk by increasing additional cost 
for monitoring and control in their operating expense. Therefore, when the bank take more risk, 
they will be less efficient and unable to compete in the long run due to their increasing inefficiency 
in the future; (ii) bad luck hypothesis state that bank unable to cope their performance due to 
external shock. When there is an exogenous event affect on loans, the bank covered this risk by 
increasing additional cost and managerial effort. These consequences led bank to decrease  their 
cost and revenue efficiency and maintain the competition in the near future; (iii) skimping 
hypothesis that is when bank valuate credit risk based upon under writing assets rather than loan 
performance. The bank will faces loan problem in the future and produces possible cost for the 
bank to manage the credit risk in the future.; (iv) moral hazard hypothesis, that bank and owner 
have moral hazard to reduce informational friction in order to maintain risk and efficiency to 
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stabilize their competition in the market. When bank face agency problem between bank manager 
and owners, it will trigger untrustworthy between them. Bank managers could take more risk to get 
more incentives when the bank capital is low and inefficient. However, although bank is well 
capitalized, this not a guarantee that bank adopt cost reducing strategies. Shareholders should 
more active in controlling bank cost or capital allocation.  
 
In private banking sector, to be efficient in scale is most logical strategy to compete in the market. It 
will difficult in private bank market offer their services with higher deposit interest rate. This policy 
will increase the loan rates and affect on higher risk taking in investment.  Increasing the cost of 
fund will reduce bank performance to compete in the market and reduce market power 
accordingly. In order to compete in the market there is two strategic actions that bank does. First, 
private banking should attracted manager who are more skilled in controlling cost and produce 
scale effect (Cocca, 2008).  This situation is reasonable if the bank has larger size in assets. Larger 
bank has capability to offer higher margin to attract more fund. Second, bank should concerned in 
specialization activity.  They  should measured share of income from fees and commission in total 
income to generate their revenue from private banking activity. According to those aspects, bank 
offer their service by identifying their peers according to asset size and product mix.  
 
Mishra and Meyer (2019) report that, the risk appetite of private bank customer in the emerging 
economy have returned after global financial crisis of 2008. The universal bank as the larger banks 
introduce private banking as a peripheral division without a real strategy on client acquisition. The 
private banking almost an add on of corporate and retail banking, therefore a private banking 
largely evolved as a product platform. The local banks as a second group of private banking in 
emerging economy, they have large client base but largely focused on mortgage lending and 
distribution of retail investment product. The local bank is required for the client to improve their 
private banking product and services as well as their strength on local market knowledge. In 
addition, private banking customer in emerging economy spread their assets over a few banks and 
will shop around for the best deal in terms of price or return. This lead that private banks have 
lowered margin and increasing risk to compete with their peers. 
 
3.2. Data and Methods 
3.2.1. Data and Sample 
 
Due to their growing market and marketing strategy intelligence it is difficult to get private banking 
data publicly. Therefore, we collected private banking data with survey. Where the data are strictly 
confidential, we only provide an abbreviation for the data that shows in our study to ensure the 
data is strictly confidential.  
 
The data were collected during September – November 2019 from 64 high level position of bank 
managers such as Vice President, Senior Vice President and Director across 32 banks. The banks 
includes universal bank, local bank, and foreign bank. The data that we collected were information 
about general profile of managers, growth of private banking customers in the latest five years, 
number of private bank customers,  as well as minimum deposit requirement for each customer.  
 
After we validated and verified the survey results, only 19 banks have consistent data in terms of 
private banking and other indicators. These data includes number of private bank customer, 
growth of private bank customers and other market data profile. Especially for customer private 
banking, we interpolate the private banking customer according to survey of growth that 
respondent answer in the questionnaire.  
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The secondary data were collected from  Financial Services Authority website7. We retrieved the 
data such as  balance sheet, income statement to measure financial, risk and cost performance in 
last five years period that is 2014 – 2018. We distinguished the dataset according to three group of 
data sets that is 
1. We classified risk into credit risk (i.e. ratio of equity and assets , ratio of loan losses reserve to 
credit, ratio of credit to assets ), operational risk (i.e. ratio of labor expenditure to other 
expenditure), liquidity risk (i.e. ratio of deposit to assets, ratio of total of cash account receivable 
and securities to assets) and general risk (ratio of profit to assets); We choose accounting risk 
measures rather than other risk measure because these indicator are available publicly and easy 
to compute. Hence the public can evaluate this risk practically without extra effort;  
2. As we noted earlier we classified bank according to their market segment and ownership. We 
clustered the bank according to Mishra and Meyer (2019).  The member of  Universal Banks are 
MND, BCA, PMT, MEG, BTN, BKP, MDT. This banks have larger bank size than other banks. 
Foreign Banks is CTB, OCN, STC, MYB, HNB, UOB, CMW, RAB, QNB; Local Bank is BJB, JTM, SSL; 
Sharia Banks: MML, MDS, BNS. 
3.  to  𝑃𝑖 is price of private banking for every bank that bank-i offer private bank as interest expense 
divided by total private bank deposit (𝑇𝑃𝐵𝐷𝑖). We calculated Total Private Bank Deposit from 
survey by estimating number of private bank customer (𝑄𝑖𝑝𝑏) and average of private bank who 
deposit in the respective bank (𝑃𝐵𝑖), then we have 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝐷𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖𝑝𝑏 × 𝑃𝐵𝑖 . In order to calculate 
growth for five years back, we calculated according to manager response about five years 
growth; Total Assets, Total Equity,  Profit, Fixed Assets were obtained from balance sheet.  
4. Cost data sets includes (𝑦𝑖  ) outputs that consist of lending (credit), deposit were obtained from 
balance sheet. 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝐷𝑖 were estimated as noted in the first point. 𝑤𝑗 price of input such as price of 
deposit (𝑟𝑑,𝑖 - interest expense divided by total deposit), price of lending (𝑟𝑙,𝑖 - interest expense 
divided by lending) and price of private banking (𝑟𝑝𝑏,𝑖),  𝜎𝑖 is risk factors such as credit risk, 
liquidity risk, or general risk Operating cost, personnel cost, and other operating cost were 
obtained from Income Statement;  
5. Conjectural parameters of demand parameters such as 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 is gross domestic product, GDP per 
capita  Risk Free Rate (Central Bank Rate) were obtained from World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI)8. 
For detail information of variables definition we presents in Table 1 as well as Descriptive Statistics 
of the variables in conjectural variation model (Table 2) and translog function model (Table 3).  
 
7 https://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/perbankan/data-dan-statistik/laporan-keuangan-perbankan/Default.aspx.  
8 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Description 





Risk Factors 1 Credit Risk 1 = Equity / Assets 2,725 0.1224951 0.0434419 0.0094327 0.2714576 
Risk Factors 2 Credit Risk 2 = Loan Losses Reserve / Credit 2,650 0.0223265 0.0199255 0 0.1200315 
Risk Factors 3 Credit Risk  3 = Credit / Assets 2,725 0.5828503 0.1642304 0.12424 0.8086935 
Risk Factors 4 Liquidity Risk  = Deposit/ Assets 2,725 0.3873867 0.1395339 0.1043069 0.7234835 
Risk Factors 5 Operational Risk  = Labor Exp./ Other Exp. 2,700 0.3162932 0.1248076 0.0244551 0.643753 
Risk Factors 6 General Risk = ROA 2,725 0.0104736 0.0138956 -0.0393104 0.0515063 
Total Assets Total Assets in Rupiah (mil) 2,750      139,000,000.00         216,000,000.00                        -          1,040,000,000.00  
Y1 (𝑇𝑃𝐵𝐷𝑖) Private Bank Deposit in Rupiah (mil) 2,750          9,710,000.00           22,800,000.00    65,600,000.00           140,000,000.00  
Y2  Credit in Rupiah (mil) 2,750        87,000,000.00         144,000,000.00                        -             719,000,000.00  
Y3 Deposito in Rupiah (mil) 2,750        43,200,000.00           50,700,000.00                        -             247,000,000.00  
Price of private banking (𝑟𝑝𝑏) 𝑃𝑝𝑏 = interest expense / private banking (%) 2,175                        0.12                           0.15                    0.00                             0.99  
Price of deposito (𝑟𝑑) 𝑃𝑑  = interest expense / total deposito (%) 2,725                        0.10                           0.04                        -                               0.23  
Central Bank Rate (𝑟𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜) BI Rate  (%) 2,750                        0.07                           0.01                    0.06                             0.09  
GDP per Capita  GDP / Population 2,750                 3,978.08                       209.46             3,692.97                      4,284.65  
Ncust Number of Customer of Private Banking (people) 2,750                 6,633.67                    8,564.79                131.22                    52,000.00  
Other Expenses Other Expenses   2,725          7,804,250.00           10,300,000.00                        -               47,800,000.00  
Profit Earning after tax 2,750          2,423,733.00             5,634,462.00    (6,495,521.00)            24,800,000.00  
Labor Expense Labor Expenses in Rupiah (mil) 2,725          1,867,770.00             2,628,455.00                        -               11,800,000.00  
Fix Assets Fix Assets in Rupiah (mil) 2,750          4,203,524.00             8,324,702.00                        -               46,800,000.00  
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix for Conjectural Variation Variables 
 𝑟𝑝𝑏 Tot. Assets N.  Cust. GDP/ Cap 𝑟𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 Oth. Expen 𝑟𝑝𝑏 1      
Tot. Assets 0.052 1     
N. Cust. 0.1707 0.9269 1    
GDP / Cap -0.0143 0.0634 0.1296 1   𝑟𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 0.0267 -0.0635 -0.1249 -0.9645 1  





Table 3. Correlation matrix for Translog Function Variables 










Risk 3 Oper. Risk 
Liquidity 
Risk General Risk 
Other Expenses 1           
Deposito 0.7318 1          
Dredit 0.8009 0.9535 1         
Private Banking 0.6595 0.6362 0.7777 1        
Labor Expense 0.8157 0.9113 0.9757 0.8617 1       
Credit Risk 1 -0.1037 0.1242 0.1909 0.2451 0.1956 1      
Credit Risk 2 0.359 0.2268 0.2477 0.1783 0.2415 0.1189 1     
Credit Risk 3 -0.0187 0.153 0.1984 0.1099 0.0866 0.3371 0.1738 1    
Oper. Risk -0.4636 -0.0763 -0.0725 0.0028 -0.0672 0.3844 -0.2665 0.0385 1   
Liquidty Risk -0.5188 -0.1986 -0.3501 -0.3653 -0.3792 0.0784 -0.3498 0.0619 0.3266 1  





In pursuance of assessing the linkage between risk and competition, we follow the analysis 
according to structural relationships of conjectural model. On the other hand, in the structural 
model we cannot investigates for each linkage directly in each structural relationship between risk 
and competition. Because, in structural model the analysis merely provides parameters for strategic 
rivalry of competition and the factors that affect for both demand and price function. 
 
When there is no further information to investigates the linkage for each transmission between risk 
and efficiency as well as risk, strategic rivalry, and market power. We can test for each linkage by 
applying reduce form equations. In doing so we conduct for each analysis by performing reduce 
form equation that connect between risk, efficiency, strategic rivalry, and market power into two 
steps analysis that is (1) risk and efficiency, (2) risk and market power; while in the last sub section 
we performed the analysis (3) structural estimation of competition.  
 
3.2.1. Risk and Efficiency 
In order to test risk and efficiency, we can test the linkage according to Fiordelisi et al.,  (2011). We 
did not conduct granger causality test because our study limited sample only five years period. The 
reason why we have this period because we retrieved sample for private banking according to 
survey method. On the other hand, we still conduct the analysis without granger causality but we 
conduct the analysis with causality effect as follows,  
 
(2) 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(ln𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 , ln 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡 , 𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑎) 
(3) 𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑎 = 𝑓(𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 , ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 , ln 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡) 
 
Where CE is cost efficiency, TA is total assets, Cust is private banking customer, RF is risk factors a consists of Risk Factor 1… Risk Factor 6 (RF1…RF6).  We estimate equation (2) and (3) with 
General Method of Moment with Two Steps Estimation with corrected standard error (robust 
matrix) (Windmeijer, 2005).   
 
The estimation (2) test whether Total Assets, Private Banking Customer and Various Risk Factors 
affect on Cost Efficiency. The Cost Efficiency was estimation with Stochastic Frontier Analysis that 
same estimation for marginal cost estimation. Whereas, estimation (3) performed to test whether 
Cost Efficiency affect on Risk Factors. We can test whether Cost Efficiency (CE) or Risk Factors (RF) 
affect more on both equations, by testing the parameter for both variables (CE and RF) have bigger 
parameters and significant.  
 
 
3.2.2. Risk and Market Power   
Applying strategic rivalry on risk management is a challenging issues. We should employ how the 
risk management for each bank in each clustered can compete in the market. The basic assumption 
we should set up that risk factor is a dynamic process. This dynamic factors should be incorporate 
into time varying bank characteristic. In order to analyzed between and within firm component. We 
can rely on variance analysis.  
 
The logic that we propose the estimation is according to Porter (1979) that firm classification for 
firm into within or between is the closest performance of firms in the industry. We can use this 
definition by applying opposite indicators. That is, when the variance of risk between firms is 
getting close, the bank has indicated into similar behavior or vice versa. We can estimated this 
analysis by performing fixed effect regression by applying risk behavior as a group effect. Abowd, 
Kramarz and Margolis (1999) or called AKM have proposed an approach in labor market. When the 
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labor are move from one plant into other plant in the United States. We have an assumptions that 
bank and risk will be similar to the behavior of this situation. We can classified the strategic rivalry 
of banks can be good or not by classifying their risk management. If we assessed that bank has a 
good risk management we can assessed for each Risk Factors by applying binary 1 and 0. That 1 is 
bank has a good management risk if they can manage their risk and vice versa. For instance, we can 
give 1 for bank with good risk management if the bank can lowered their risk in previous period, 
otherwise 0 if they performed increase in risk taking behavior. The behavior of risk management 1 
and 0, then performed as a risk mover whether bank can tackle their risk behavior.  
 
(4) var(ln(𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡))𝑖𝑡) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑓(𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 , ln(𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑎 , 𝑑𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑓)⏟                    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑐)⏟    𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖𝑡) 
 
In equation (4) we can analyzed whether risk is significant to increase on private bank customer or 
within firm dispersion. Which means whether the risk factors will be significant within its own 
group and creating barrier for other to enter this strategic group. Or, is there any dispersion from 
other group to enter between bank cluster.   
 
 
3.2.3. Structural Estimation of Competition 
We should portrayed bank heterogeneity with input and multiple output process that incorporate 
structural model competition with conjectural estimation. The equation should reflect Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1984) that each strategic action treats that indicates on marginal cost, demand and 
price function. In order to estimate structural equation of conjectural variation we estimate the 
conjectural equation according to  
 
(5) 𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖′ − (𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝑖′ ⋅ 𝜃𝑖𝑗′) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖 is price of private banking for every bank that bank I offer private bank as interest 
expense divided by total private bank deposit, 𝐶𝑖′ is marginal cost function as first order condition 
of cost (i.e. operating cost of bank), 𝑄𝑖  is demand for private bank sector (i.e. number of private 
bank customer or amount of private bank value), 𝜃𝑖𝑗′ is conjectural parameter that represent as 
price difference  between bank i and bank j  determined the price of private bank-i.  
 
Equation (1) indicates that the price of private bank determined by marginal cost minus conjectural 
parameters. The conjectural parameters estimated through conjectural matrix as a payoff between 
bank-i and bank-j. The price difference of 𝑃𝑖′ and response curve of demand for private banking 
customer (𝑄𝑖). We noted that if bank may creates positive prices, this condition will fulfill if  the 
conjectural parameters larger than its marginal cost.  Empirically, we derived equation (5) into 
econometric equation as follow  
 
(6) ln(𝑃𝑖) = 𝜓1 ⋅ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝜓2 ⋅ ln(𝑇𝐴)+𝜓3 ⋅ ln(𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡) + 𝜓4 ⋅ ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝜓5 ⋅ 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 + 𝜖𝜓 
(7) ln(𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡) = 𝛿1 ⋅ 𝜃𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿2 ⋅ 𝑀𝐶𝑖 + 𝜖_𝛿 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖 is price of private banking, TA is total assets, Cust is number of private banking customer, 
GDP/Capita is Gross Domestic Product per Capita, MC is marginal cost.  We estimate equation (6) 
and (7) through simultaneous equations.  The equations (6) and (7) inform us that conjectural 
variation parameter estimated with macro variable. Equation (6) as the price equation assess 
whether private bank customer are attracted with respective private banking deposit rate. This 
equation indicates how the customer affect on deposit rate offer for private banking . Equation (7) 
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as a demand for private banking portrayed how customer attracted to be private bank customer 
through deposit rates along with increasing its marginal cost behavior.  
 
The term of 𝜃𝑖𝑗 is price difference effect that associated with marginal cost with incorporate risk 
function.  The association between price difference of private banking measure how the price 
difference between bank will attract consumer. If we follow recent study such as Carbo-Valverde et 
al., ( 2011), Gerritsen and Bikker (2018) the price difference will increase number of customer and 
have positive relationships. On the other hand, if we follow equation (5) when price difference 
associate with marginal cost. The effect will be negative. Risk factor that incorporate in marginal 
cost will change consumer preferences to hold their investment in private banking and change their 
preferences other than private banking services. When the price difference is wide, the logic of 
consumer will assessed their preference whether this price difference along with increasing risk. 
We expect that this terms will be negative due to consumer risk preferences to hold or avoiding in 
private banking.   
 
We estimated equation (6) and (7) with System General Method of Moment (SGMM). We choose 
this approach to follow Shaffer and Spierdijk  (2017) critique about the parameters that produce in 
simultaneous equation modeling, that parameter assumption should be 0. We consider that SGMM 
can solve this problem.  
 
We classified risk into three six categories such as credit risk, liquidity risk and general risk.  The 
bank affected by their risk through cost function. When the risk is manageable such as credit risk, 
liquidity risk, or general risk. Hence, bank will not pay more cost to cover the uncertainty of cost. In 
this cost equation, risk have internalized in cost factors as an effort of bank to minimizing of risk 
and cost. In order to estimate 𝐶𝑖′ as a marginal function, we conducted with translog cost function 
that incorporated risk in the model. For detail of function please see Appendix. 
 
(8) ln 𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖 +∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑗 ln𝑤𝑗 + 12∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑗𝑖 + 12∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln𝑤𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗𝑖 +∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 +𝑖 12∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 +∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝜎𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 +𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝑖  
 
Where 𝐶𝑖′ is operating cost of bank, 𝑦𝑖  are outputs that consist of lending, deposit, and private bank, 𝑤𝑗 price of input such as price of deposit, price of lending and price of private banking, 𝜎𝑖 is risk 
factors such as risk factors (RF1…RF6). We estimated equation (5) by Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) with Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation.  
 
According to equation (5) risk and other factors have positive relationship, when the cost or risk 
are increased the cost of bank will increase along with increasing in output such as lending, deposit, 
or private banking. Most of expected signs in equation (5) are positive along with other factors 
includes private market share function (demand for private bank)  and capital function (cost of 
capital function). We assign additional equation in equation (2) that risk and cost determined by 
both market condition and investment of bank (capital). As we mentioned earlier, when the bank 
increase their investment to act whether tough or soft to accommodate market or deter the entry. 
Bank will act simultaneously and portrayed in their cost.  Please see detail in Appendix B for further 
derivation.   
The marginal cost estimation estimated by the equation  
(9) 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡ln𝑦𝑝𝑏 (𝛼0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖 +∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑗 ln𝑤𝑗 + 12∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑗𝑖 + 12∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln𝑤𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗𝑖 +∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 +𝑖 12∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 +∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝜎𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 +𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝑖) 
 18 
 
Where MC is marginal cost, TC is total cost, ln 𝑌𝑝𝑏 is output of private banking deposit,  𝑦𝑖  are 
outputs that consist of lending, deposit, and private bank, 𝑤𝑗 price of input such as price of deposit, 
price of lending and price of private banking, 𝑤𝑗 price of input such as price of deposit, price of 
lending and price of private banking and 𝜎𝑖 is risk factors. 
 
3.3. Limitation of Models 
Our paper has a limitation is some respects that is (a) our period analysis is limited for five years 
and the limited sample banks, whereas the analysis the conjectural variations should be in longer 
period such as ten years period and more banks such as more than 100 banks as conducted by Más-
Ruiz et al., (2014). This longer period can assess the path and behavior of risk and efficiency with 
more accurate behavior and smooth price behavior; (b) There is some aspect that should be 
carefully for adapting conjectural variation in financial product differ in fundamental ways from 
non financial product. In our model, because we incorporating risk form both sides that is deposit, 
private banking, and lending. A loan as an agreement on a dynamic reallocation of money between 
the borrower and the lender is an agreement for money at a fixed point in time. Therefore, the 
conjectural variation model ideally based upon net present value frameworks (Overvest, 2017); (c) 
our model is not in Nash equilibrium behavior, therefore we can suggest that next endeavor to 
include this approach in the modelling process.  
 
 
 4. Results and Discussion 
In this section we are going to present our results according to our methodology and hypothesis 
argument. As we note earlier, that our analysis conducted in three consecutive steps. The first step 
is analyzing causality effect by applying reduce form equation to measure the linkage between risk 
and efficiency with GMM estimation. The second step is analyzing the linkage between risk 
behavior and market power with modified fixed effect regression; and the last is analyzing the 
structural equation of conjectural model.   
 
At the first results that we presents is causality effect of cost efficiency and risk or vice versa. The 
cost efficiency were estimated with six translog functions with different risk characteristic that 
produce different efficiency. We provide detail of estimation in the appendix for complete results. 
Furthermore, in Table 4, we presents the estimation result of our reduce form model according to 
equation (2). We test that the whole risk are significant on cost efficiency of on private bank service. 
Only Credit Risk 2 (Loan Losses Reserve / Credit), and Credit Risk 3 (Credit / Assets) have negative 
relationship and significant on cost efficiency. On the other hand, for other risks such as Credit Risk 
1 (Equity/Assets), Liquidity Risk (Deposito/Assets), Operational Risk (Labor Expenditure/ Other 
Expenditure), and General Risk (Return on Assets) have positive relationship and significant.  
 
4.1. Risk and Efficiency  
If we looking at the parameters at Credit Risk 1 at the first column in Table 4, the parameters shows 
that increasing ratio of equity to assets increases cost efficiency and vice versa. This results inline 
with the theory that increasing ratio of equity will increase assets, which means that bank has good 
risk management to ensure that equity and assets has positive relationship with cost efficiency. At 
this moment there is no significant risk of Credit Risk 1 can reduce cost efficiency in our sample.   
 
At the second column in Table 4, that Credit Risk 2 has negative relationship with cost efficiency of 
private banks. This results inform us that there is increasing Loan Losses Reserve while Credit is 
increasing. This condition has been reduce cost efficiency. Which means, increasing of credit will 
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increase the Loan Losses Reserve and reduce the cost efficiency, because bank should provide more 
cost to cover default for credit. The parameter also towards to one, which means that increasing 
more lending will decrease the cost efficiency for competing in private banking. We can claim that 
there is a bad management hypothesis in the respective bank sample.  
 
At the third column in Table 4, show that Credit Risk 3 has a negative relationships with cost 
efficiency of private banking. Which means that increasing of ratio of credit to assets, decrease 
efficiency. This indicator suggest that there is a bad management practices of credit and risk 
management that reduce the cost of efficiency. Its indicate that bank unable to allocate properly on 
the output. While its indicated that increasing deposit followed by increasing in assets, this 
activities reduce cost efficiency of bank.  
 
The fourth column of Table 4 indicates that liquidity risk has positive and significant relationships. 
Which means, increasing deposit to assets increase efficiency. This parameters indicate us that 
increasing of deposit has been allocated properly to asses activity that produce efficiency.  The 
activity can be opening more branch or other assets that attract consumer to deposit in bank 
sample.  
 
The fifth column in Table 4 inform us that bank has manage operational risk to ensure efficiency. 
Although there is increasing in labor expense on the other hand other expense also increase along 
with improving efficiency. The sample bank has been good for managing their liquidity risk that 
produce bank increase their efficiency. In the last column of Table 4 its indicates that bank has a 
good in return and increasing their assets to increase their efficiency. This indication suggest that 
return has been properly allocate in assets to improve their efficiency.   
 
If we looking at the results, banks has been allocated into asset to reach their market segments. It 
indicates the number of customer of private banking has positive and significant relationship with 
cost efficiency. This results support that private banking in Indonesia has been a prospect market 
for Indonesian bank to attract their emerging wealth consumer.  
 
Table 4.  Causality Effect Between  Risk and Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Cost Eff Cost Eff Cost Eff Cost Eff Cost Eff Cost Eff 
Ln(TA) 0.00990*** 0.0148*** 0.0222*** 0.0136*** 0.00395*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.000556) (0.000517) (0.000897) (0.000585) (0.000377) (0.000480) 
Ln(Cust) 0.0163*** 0.0134*** 0.00406*** 0.0129*** 0.0135*** 0.00442*** 
 (0.00103) (0.00112) (0.00127) (0.00113) (0.000705) (0.00109) 
cr_risk1 0.360***      
 (0.0289)      
cr_risk2  -0.737***     
  (0.0623)     
cr_risk3   -0.119***    
   (0.0123)    
liq_risk    0.0198**   
    (0.00775)   
oper_risk     0.573***  
     (0.00993)  
gen_risk      1.339*** 
      (0.0825) 
       
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,700 2,725 
Hansen Test       
Robust standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: cr_risk1 = Equity / Assets; cr_risk2=Loan Losses Reserve / Credit; cr_risk3 = Credit / Assets; liq_risk = Deposit/ Assets; 
oper_risk = Labor Expd. / Other Exp; gen_risk = ROA; lta=ln(Total Assets); lcust = ln(Private Banking Customer) 
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Table 5. Causality Effect between  Risk and Efficiency  
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES cr_risk1 cr_risk2 cr_risk3 liq_risk oper_risk gen_risk 
       
Cost Eff -0.00169 -0.0258*** -0.460*** 0.654*** 0.244*** 0.0238*** 
 (0.00377) (0.00174) (0.0193) (0.0100) (0.0164) (0.00132) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.00871*** 0.00115*** 0.0578*** 0.0172*** 0.0390*** -0.00124*** 
 (0.000200) (0.000111) (0.000665) (0.000369) (0.000768) (4.95e-05) 
Ln(Customer) -0.00403*** 0.00104*** -0.0333*** -0.0288*** -0.0496*** 0.00305*** 
 (0.000374) (0.000240) (0.00134) (0.000668) (0.00178) (0.000117) 
       
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,700 2,725 2,725 
Hansen Test        
Robust standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: cr_risk1 = Equity / Assets; cr_risk2=Loan Losses Reserve / Credit; cr_risk3 = Credit / Assets; liq_risk = Deposit/ Assets; 
oper_risk = Labor Expd. / Other Exp; gen_risk = ROA; lta=ln(Total Assets); lcust = ln(Private Banking Customer) 
 
If we compare the results of causality effect of Risk and Efficiency for both Table 4 and Table 5. If 
we looking at the parameter for each risk factors. Apparently, Credit Risk 1 has more affect on Cost 
Efficiency, rather than Cost Efficiency to Credit Risk 1. On Credit Risk 2, Credit Risk 2 has more 
effect on Cost Efficiency rather than Cost Efficiency. Moreover, Cost Efficiency has more effect on 
Credit Risk 3 than vice versa, Cost Efficiency has more effect than Liquidity Risk, Operational Risk 
and General Risk have more effect on Cost Efficiency. From these information, we can claim that 
only Credit Risk 3 (Column 9) and Liquidity Risk (Column 10) have more affected by Cost Efficiency 
rather than other risk factors such as Credit Risk 1 (Column 1), Credit Risk 2 (Column 2), 
Operational Risk (Column 5) and General Risk (Column 6) on Cost Efficiency.  
 
These results suggest that  for both Credit Risk 3 and Liquidity Risk 3, the risks are affected by Cost 
Efficiency. When the banks are inefficient will increase Credit Risk 3, whereas in Liquidity Risk, 
when the bank is efficient increase liquidity. For other risk its indicates that managing good risk 
factors will effect on Cost Efficiency. In daily practices, these results can stimulate improve their 
risk management especially in credit allocation. Increasing in credit allocation will reduce the 
efficiency. The growing of credit market such as in Indonesia requires more financial development 
and improving their literacy to get access for credit. While the demand for credit is increase 
significantly, bad management for bank to get risk appetite have reduce their cost efficiency.  
 
 
4.2.Risk and Market Power 
In this sub section we are going to test the linkage between risk market power through risk 
behavior of sample banks. We estimated for each risk factors on number of private banking 
customer as a market power for banks. For each estimation in Table 6 – Table 11 depicted for each 
Risk Factors effect on increasing of private banking customer. We estimate with fixed effect model 
associated with other control variables such as Cost Efficiency and Total Assets.  
 
We include these variables because risk factors, cost efficiency and bank size are good factors for 
the private banking customer to invest in the sample banks. As we noted in literature review, that  
asymmetric rivalry of bank within and between group will occur through their performance such as 
cost efficiency and risk management. In our model, we incorporated these variables to proof 
whether these performance are important for bank to attract private bank customer. We defined 




In addition, if we conduct analysis with these variables without risk behavior it does not reflect how 
the bank can manage it risk to attract this behavior. Therefore, we presents the results from OLS 
estimation  corrected towards Abowd et al., (1999) modified fixed effect regression In each table 
we performed six estimation that show the robust results of each estimation technique according  
strategic group cluster. The estimations were from OLS within and corrected with panel fixed effect 
model, followed by between strategic group estimation.    
 
As we can see in each table, panel regression with AKM has offered better results in terms of better 
standard error, expected sign, and significance. We focus the estimation for within strategic group 
in column Panel Within Strategic Group whereas between group estimation in column Panel 
Between Strategic Group with AKM method. In order to test the results we looking at the Risk 
Factor for both within and between whether the parameters have correct sign and significance or 
not.  
 
The effect of risk factors that significantly effect on number of customer of private banking are 
Credit Risk 2 in Table 7 and Credit Risk 3 in Table 8 in cluster between strategic group. On the other 
hand, General Risk affect significantly on private banking customer are exist for both within 
strategic group and between group in Table 11. According to these results we can stated that the 
risk factors that significantly effect on customer within group only general risk factor. The general 
risk defined as a ratio of return on assets. Its indicates that managing general risk behavior within 
strategic group will increase market power. If we looking at this results, return and assets is crucial 
factor for consumer to get private banking services. Within their cluster such as universal, foreign, 
local, and sharia banks, return and assets performance are a significant indicators that private 
banking customer will attract to invest in respected banks.  
 
If we looking at between strategic group, the results confirm Smith et al., (1997) finding that 
competition is not to compare of inter and intra group rivalry but how to group acts competitively 
in the market. These results also support managing better risk management practices along with 
cost efficiency and total assets are significance factor to attract private bank customer. The most 
significance risk that reducing private banking customer is increasing of Credit Risk 2 as the ratio of 
Loan Losses Reserve to Credit. In this estimation we support previous results that increasing of 
better management in credit risk assessment is a mitigation action for bank to reduce credit default 
in the future. The following results for Credit Risk 3 also support the previous results that 
increasing ratio of credit to assets decrease private bank customer. These results confirm the 
previous reduce form results as depicted in Table 4 and Table 5 that parameter have similar 
expected sign.  
 
If we looking at the cluster effect in Table 6 - Table 11, the cluster effect are not significantly effect 
on market power. We can see the parameters (F1, F2, F3, F4) are not significantly effect on private 
bank customer. This means, that within strategic group there is not significant rivalry within of 
them. On the other hand, the strategic rivalry is exist to compete without boundary within strategic 
group otherwise bank compete with other strategic group outside their group.  
 
Our results is different with Más-Ruiz et al., (2014), that in Spain banking industry there is within 
and between strategic group. This different led by the nature of bank industry between Spain 
economy and Indonesian economy. As we noted earlier, Indonesia as an emerging market has 
growing potential for private banking prospect. With Indonesian market potential, the demand for 
private banking is emerging. We will confirm this finding with the following section of results from 








Table 6. Estimation of The Effect of Credit Risk 1, Total Assets, and Cost Efficiency on Log of Private Banking Customers 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 

























AKM   
VARIABLES lcust lcust lcust Lcust Lcust lcust 
       
Cost Efficiency 1.501 1.485 2.110** 1.476 1.814 1.507*** 
 (0.808) (0.541) (0.557) (1.165) (1.920) (0.231) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.702 0.700 0.663* 0.646** 0.628 0.674*** 
 (0.127) (0.157) (0.271) (0.265) (0.205) (0.0388) 
Credit Risk 1 0.533 0.367 -0.644 -0.287 1.329 -0.478 
 (3.549) (6.184) (3.861) (6.357) (11.81) (1.044) 
o.dy_2014 -      
       
dy_2015 0.130 -0.246 -0.269* -0.176   
 (0.102) (0.438) (0.0918) (0.379)   
dy_2016 0.265 -0.112* -0.0966 -0.0656 0.278 0.167* 
 (0.340) (0.0117) (0.0651) (0.192) (0.330) (0.0893) 
dy_2017 0.326 -0.0509 -0.00965 0.0487 0.301 0.266*** 
 (0.426) (0.0853) (0.117) (0.151) (0.631) (0.0782) 
dy_2018 0.368    0.646 0.291*** 
 (0.195)    (0.712) (0.0817) 
dy_2014  -0.375 -0.433* -0.342   
  (0.314) (0.158) (0.300)   
o.dy_2018  - - -   
       
F_1     0.414 0.525 
     (1.083) (0.001) 
F_2     0.229 0.392 
     (1.071) (0.002) 
F_3     -0.154 -0.00923 
     (1.305) (0.007) 
o.F_4     - 0 
      (0) 
Constant -5.333 -4.898 -4.331 -3.893 -4.465  
 (2.254) (3.524) (4.421) (5.078) (3.292)  
       
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 1,725 . 
R-squared 0.449 0.444 0.397 0.351 0.530  
Number of d_risk_w  2   2  
Number of s    8   
Number of cid   4    




Table 7.Estimation of The Effect of Credit Risk 2, Total Assets, and Cost Efficiency on Log of Private Banking Customers 























with AKM   
VARIABLES lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust 
       
Cost Efficiency 0.757* 0.712* 1.177 1.131 0.741 0.802*** 
 (0.0981) (0.0701) (0.990) (0.907) (1.387) (0.197) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.726 0.723 0.701* 0.652* 0.661 0.684*** 
 (0.225) (0.222) (0.278) (0.328) (0.368) (0.0258) 
Credit Risk 2 -6.515 -8.321 -8.263 -10.86 -1.913 -6.794*** 
 (4.662) (5.095) (7.581) (9.508) (3.933) (1.752) 
dy_2014 -0.255 -0.372 -0.405* -0.545   
 (0.0974) (0.136) (0.158) (0.292)   
dy_2015 -0.182 -0.289 -0.266* -0.364*   
 (0.101) (0.0767) (0.0889) (0.166)   
dy_2016 -0.0258 -0.118 -0.0749 -0.102 0.0758 0.115 
 (0.126) (0.118) (0.0810) (0.221) (0.286) (0.110) 
o.dy_2017 -      
       
dy_2018 0.0642    -0.000936 0.173 
 (0.0190)    (0.0821) (0.111) 
dy_2017  -0.0942** -0.0334 -0.0465 -0.339* 0.00734 
  (0.00532) (0.125) (0.225) (0.0463) (0.111) 
o.dy_2018  - - -   
       
F_1     0.242 0.249 
     (0.113) (0.006) 
F_2     0.310 0.303 
     (0.491) (0.004) 
F_3     -0.512 -0.470 
     (0.128) (0.002) 
o.F_4     - 0 
      (0) 
Constant -5.064 -4.847 -4.680 -3.680 -4.354  
 (4.005) (3.937) (4.793) (6.018) (7.433)  
       
Observations 2,650 2,650 2,650 2,650 1,650 . 
R-squared 0.455 0.453 0.399 0.363 0.468  
Number of d_risk_w  2   2  
Number of s    7   
Number of cid   4    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 8. Estimation of The Effect of Credit Risk  3, Total Assets, and Cost Efficiency on Log of Private Banking Customers 

















Group    
Panel between 
strategic group 
with CMD  
Panel between 
strategic group 
with AKM   
VARIABLES lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust 
       
Cost Efficiency 0.589 0.690 1.213 0.756 0.817 0.678*** 
 (0.643) (0.549) (0.825) (0.466) (0.390) (0.262) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.705* 0.747 0.669* 0.662** 0.583 0.708*** 
 (0.102) (0.123) (0.265) (0.210) (0.157) (0.0295) 
Credit Risk  3 -1.079 -0.353 -4.143* -2.692 -4.050** -1.539*** 
 (0.766) (1.482) (1.648) (1.537) (0.288) (0.240) 
o.dy_2014 -      
       
dy_2015 0.107 -0.0594 -0.205 -0.0652   
 (0.240) (0.545) (0.146) (0.289)   
dy_2016 0.192 0.0594 -0.125 0.00791 0.493 0.329*** 
 (0.331) (0.0443) (0.121) (0.103) (0.195) (0.0800) 
dy_2017 0.217 0.0584 -0.111 0.0220 0.678 0.272*** 
 (0.387) (0.0860) (0.139) (0.105) (0.149) (0.0822) 
dy_2018 0.322    0.426 0.0791 
 (0.439)    (0.109) (0.0896) 
dy_2014  -0.163 -0.375 -0.198   
  (0.274) (0.241) (0.257)   
o.dy_2018  - - -   
       
F_1     2.098 1.168 
     (0.576) (0.001) 
F_2     1.813 0.868 
     (0.467) (0.002) 
F_3     1.719 0.758 
     (0.813) (0.813) 
o.F_4     - 0 
      (0) 
Constant -4.391 -5.436 -1.932 -2.532 -2.159  
 (2.923) (3.212) (4.183) (3.961) (2.947)  
       
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 1,700 . 
R-squared 0.452 0.473 0.463 0.421 0.604  
Number of d_risk_w  2   2  
Number of s    8   
Number of cid   4    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 9. Estimation of The Effect of Liquidity Risk  , Total Assets, and Cost Efficiency on Log of Private Banking Customers 
 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 















Group    
Panel between 
strategic group 





AKM   
VARIABLES lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust 
       
Cost Efficiency 1.352* 1.044 1.733* 0.988** 1.519 1.153*** 
 (0.124) (0.409) (0.695) (0.300) (0.504) (0.185) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.649** 0.634* 0.554 0.654 0.463** 0.623*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0664) (0.350) (0.452) (0.0298) (0.0233) 
Liquidity Risk   -1.213 -0.172 -1.957 -1.395 -0.827 -0.212 
 (1.190) (2.116) (0.962) (1.895) (2.957) (0.234) 
o.dy_2014 -      
       
dy_2015 0.133** -0.0473 -0.264** -0.0641   
 (0.00800) (0.110) (0.0777) (0.278)   
dy_2016 0.265 0.0471 -0.106 0.0696 0.236 0.226*** 
 (0.0867) (0.0647) (0.0486) (0.237) (0.0474) (0.0644) 
dy_2017 0.329* 0.122 -0.0165 0.163 0.283*** 0.305*** 
 (0.0504) (0.189) (0.103) (0.222) (0.000706) (0.0704) 
dy_2018 0.372    0.535*** 0.0979 
 (0.335)    (0.00501) (0.0655) 
dy_2014  -0.173 -0.422* -0.176   
  (0.103) (0.144) (0.310)   
o.dy_2018  - - -   
       
F_1     0.876 0.791 
     (0.961) (0.001) 
F_2     0.480 0.502 
     (0.656) (0.003) 
F_3     0.209 0.266 
     (1.066) (0.005) 
o.F_4     - 0 
      (0) 
Constant -3.817** -3.619 -1.593 -3.482 -1.145  
 (0.252) (0.628) (6.594) (8.818) (1.186)  
       
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 1,500 . 
R-squared 0.460 0.385 0.423 0.345 0.374  
Number of d_risk_w  2   2  
Number of s    8   
Number of cid   4    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 10. Estimation of The Effect of Operational Risk  , Total Assets, and Cost Efficiency on Log of Private Banking Customers 



























AKM   
VARIABLES lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust 
       
Cost Efficiency 1.118 1.098 1.675 1.710 1.347 0.953** 
 (0.587) (0.785) (3.241) (2.044) (0.394) (0.403) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.705* 0.692 0.699** 0.733** 0.661 0.659*** 
 (0.0647) (0.138) (0.202) (0.240) (0.146) (0.0306) 
Operational Risk   0.153 0.383 0.542 1.552 1.742 0.157 
 (2.580) (4.025) (2.057) (2.343) (3.793) (0.293) 
dy_2014 -0.150 -0.292* -0.344 -0.103   
 (0.0694) (0.0407) (0.203) (0.258)   
dy_2015 -0.0671 -0.200 -0.232 -0.00172   
 (0.0466) (0.131) (0.103) (0.223)   
dy_2016 0.00289 -0.0987 -0.158 0.101 0.503 0.130* 
 (0.0344) (0.312) (0.0896) (0.257) (0.242) (0.0738) 
o.dy_2017 -      
       
dy_2018 0.162    0.232 0.231*** 
 (0.0997)    (0.0871) (0.0834) 
dy_2017  -0.117 -0.156 0.149 0.168 0.153** 
  (0.188) (0.0875) (0.276) (0.140) (0.0747) 
o.dy_2018  - - -   
       
F_1     0.446 0.286 
     (0.346) (0.001) 
F_2     0.380 0.158 
     (0.206) (0.002) 
F_3     -0.0766 -0.215 
     (0.489) (0.001) 
o.F_4     - 0 
      (0.003) 
Constant -5.458* -5.150 -5.719** -6.887* -5.790  
 (0.740) (1.700) (1.169) (3.424) (1.611)  
       
Observations 2,700 2,700 2,700 2,700 1,575 . 
R-squared 0.437 0.382 0.375 0.383 0.435  
Number of d_risk_w  2   2  
Number of s    8   
Number of cid   4    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Estimation of The Effect of General Risk, Total Assets, and Cost Efficiency on Log of Private Banking Customers 
 (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 
























AKM   
VARIABLES lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust lcust 
       
Cost Efficiency 1.074 1.133 1.499* 1.368 2.175*** 1.367*** 
 (0.223) (0.210) (0.592) (0.915) (0.0168) (0.256) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.639 0.625 0.585 0.598 0.596 0.595*** 
 (0.123) (0.127) (0.317) (0.326) (0.102) (0.0305) 
General Risk 15.19** 10.65 20.25 23.92** 32.62 12.41*** 
 (0.702) (2.855) (13.86) (9.251) (17.48) (2.154) 
o.dy_2014 -      
       
dy_2015 0.217** -0.303 -0.241** -0.148   
 (0.0107) (0.1000) (0.0745) (0.174)   
dy_2016 0.349 -0.207 -0.0829 -0.00185 0.715 0.340*** 
 (0.180) (0.268) (0.0654) (0.277) (0.562) (0.0879) 
dy_2017 0.387** -0.104 -0.0272 -0.000699 0.582 0.405*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0623) (0.110) (0.135) (0.281) (0.0858) 
dy_2018 0.444*    0.857* 0.534*** 
 (0.0680)    (0.0700) (0.100) 
dy_2014  -0.458* -0.515* -0.503**   
  (0.0707) (0.208) (0.173)   
o.dy_2018  - - -   
       
F_1     0.666 0.385 
     (0.187) (0.001) 
F_2     0.488 0.178 
     (0.507) (0.003) 
F_3     0.276 0.0987 
     (0.338) (0.004) 
o.F_4     - 0 
      (0) 
Constant -4.274 -3.498 -3.069 -3.334 -4.813  
 (2.028) (2.066) (5.528) (5.743) (1.233)  
       
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 1,650 . 
R-squared 0.463 0.414 0.420 0.394 0.572  
Number of 
d_risk_w 
 2   2  
Number of s    8   
Number of cid   4    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.3. Structural Estimation of Conjectural Variation 
 
In the following paragraph, we are going to discuss about the results of estimation of equation (6) 
and (7) or we called as structural conjectural equation with Two Stage Least Square (2SLS), Three 
Stage Least Square (3SLS) and System General Method of Moment (SGMM) method. We estimate 
those system of equation into six type of risks. The results presents in the following Table 12 – 17.  
 
The results informed us that structural model that especially with 2SLS and SGMM that 
incorporated risk factor on cost function and feed into supply and demand equation produce 
expected sign. Furthermore, 2SLS and SGMM produce more robust results as indicates by 
increasing parameter magnitude and reducing standard error. The sign inline with our equation in 
terms of basic equation of supply and demand such as price effect (𝜃𝑖𝑗=lr_pb_ij) on demand 
equation has negative sign while MC has positive sign. On the other hand, 3SLS produce different 
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results  against the theory supply and demand. Its indicates by marginal equation in 3SLS have 
wrong sign. We focus the results in 2SLS and SGMM than 3SLS.  
 
Another facts that we are surprise with the results in unexpected sign of bank size (total assets). 
The sign suppose to positive sign that means increasing in total assets will increase on price of 
output of private banking. Contrary, the results has negative sign which means that increasing of 
total assets will reduce the price of private banking. If we looking at previous reduce form results 
such as risk behavior and behavior and market power (Table 11). The result is not surprising. At 
this moment along with emerging economies that indicate by increasing gross domestic per capita 
(GDP/Capita). The banks sample has been increase their assets to reach private banking market, 
and improve their cost efficiency (better management and tackle general risk management) by 
improving their assets.  
 
In addition, in private banking market the negative terms also inform us that larger bank play fat 
cat strategy. If we looking at Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) taxonomy, fat cat strategy act stated that 
the larger banks creates its own barriers and produce relative cost of advantage to gain market 
power. The typical of large bank size in Indonesia usually they have large market segment and long 
standing experience. The customer loyalty and good reputation branding has shaped customer only 




Table 12. Estimation of Conjectural Variation Equation (1) According to Credit Risk 1 
 (49) (50) (51) 
 2SLS 3SLS SGMM 
VARIABLES lr_pb lcust lr_pb lcust xp xq 
       
lta -1.085***  -1.093***  -1.105***  
 (0.0390)  (0.0389)  (0.0334)  
lcust 1.714***  1.737***  1.686***  
 (0.0470)  (0.0470)  (0.0413)  
lgdpc 0.247***  0.252***  0.333***  
 (0.0514)  (0.0512)  (0.0474)  
r_d_macro 0.0986***  0.0997***  0.0848***  
 (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0234)  
mc 0.000770 0.276*** -0.00262 0.276*** 0.00134 0.590*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00811) (0.00168) (0.00810) (0.000994) (0.0255) 
lr_pb_ij  -0.231***  -0.231***  -0.834*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0764)  (0.0813) 
       
Observations 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 
R-squared 0.907 0.360 0.904 0.360   
Hansen Test       
Standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  SGMM Estimated with Robust Two Steps Estimator 
Note: lcust=ln(Customer of Private Banking); lta = ln(Total Assets); lgdpc = ln(GDP/capita), r_d_macro = deposit interest rate by central bank, 





Table 13. Estimation of Conjectural Variation Equation (1) According to Credit Risk 2 
 (52) (53) (54) 
 2SLS 3SLS SGMM 
VARIABLES lr_pb lcust lr_pb lcust xp xq 
       
lta -1.085***  -1.093***  -1.104***  
 (0.0390)  (0.0389)  (0.0334)  
lcust 1.713***  1.736***  1.685***  
 (0.0470)  (0.0469)  (0.0412)  
lgdpc 0.247***  0.252***  0.332***  
 (0.0514)  (0.0512)  (0.0474)  
r_d_macro 0.0985***  0.0996***  0.0847***  
 (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0233)  
mc 0.000823 0.276*** -0.00256 0.276*** 0.00148 0.589*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00810) (0.00168) (0.00809) (0.000991) (0.0255) 
lr_pb_ij  -0.231***  -0.230***  -0.834*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0764)  (0.0813) 
       
Observations 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 
R-squared 0.907 0.360 0.904 0.360   
Hansen Test       
Standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, SGMM Estimated with Robust Two Steps Estimator 
Note: lcust=ln(Customer of Private Banking); lta = ln(Total Assets); lgdpc = ln(GDP/capita), r_d_macro = deposit interest rate by central bank, 
lr_pb_ij (ln(r_i/r_j) = 𝜃𝑖𝑗 
 
Table 14. Estimation of Conjectural Variation Equation (1) According to Credit Risk 3 
 (55) (56) (57) 
 2SLS 3SLS SGMM 
VARIABLES lr_pb lcust lr_pb lcust xp xq 
       
lta -1.085***  -1.093***  -1.104***  
 (0.0390)  (0.0389)  (0.0334)  
lcust 1.713***  1.736***  1.685***  
 (0.0470)  (0.0469)  (0.0412)  
lgdpc 0.247***  0.252***  0.333***  
 (0.0514)  (0.0512)  (0.0474)  
r_d_macro 0.0985***  0.0996***  0.0848***  
 (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0233)  
mc 0.000847 0.277*** -0.00256 0.277*** 0.00156 0.592*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00812) (0.00169) (0.00812) (0.000997) (0.0255) 
lr_pb_ij  -0.232***  -0.232***  -0.835*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0763)  (0.0812) 
       
Observations 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 
R-squared 0.907 0.361 0.904 0.361   
Hansen Test       
Standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, SGMM Estimated with Robust Two Steps Estimator 
Note: lcust=ln(Customer of Private Banking); lta = ln(Total Assets); lgdpc = ln(GDP/capita), r_d_macro = deposit interest rate by central bank, 




Table 15. Estimation of Conjectural Variation Equation (1) According to Liquidity Risk  
 (58) (59) (60) 
 2SLS 3SLS SGMM 
VARIABLES lr_pb lcust lr_pb lcust xp xq 
       
lta -1.085***  -1.093***  -1.105***  
 (0.0390)  (0.0389)  (0.0334)  
lcust 1.714***  1.737***  1.686***  
 (0.0470)  (0.0470)  (0.0413)  
lgdpc 0.247***  0.252***  0.333***  
 (0.0514)  (0.0512)  (0.0475)  
r_d_macro 0.0986***  0.0997***  0.0850***  
 (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0234)  
mc 0.000770 0.277*** -0.00263 0.277*** 0.00133 0.591*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00811) (0.00168) (0.00811) (0.000996) (0.0255) 
lr_pb_ij  -0.232***  -0.231***  -0.834*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0764)  (0.0813) 
       
Observations 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 
R-squared 0.907 0.360 0.904 0.360   
Hansen Test       
Standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, SGMM Estimated with Robust Two Steps Estimator 
Note: lcust=ln(Customer of Private Banking); lta = ln(Total Assets); lgdpc = ln(GDP/capita), r_d_macro = deposit interest rate by central bank, 
lr_pb_ij (ln(r_i/r_j) = 𝜃𝑖𝑗. 
 
Table 16. Estimation of Conjectural Variation Equation (1) According to Operational Risk 
 (61) (62) (63) 
 2SLS 3SLS SGMM 
VARIABLES lr_pb lcust lr_pb lcust xp xq 
       
lta -1.084***  -1.092***  -1.105***  
 (0.0389)  (0.0388)  (0.0333)  
lcust 1.712***  1.735***  1.683***  
 (0.0469)  (0.0469)  (0.0411)  
lgdpc 0.246***  0.251***  0.335***  
 (0.0513)  (0.0511)  (0.0473)  
r_d_macro 0.0983***  0.0994***  0.0848***  
 (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0233)  
mc 0.00102 0.276*** -0.00236 0.276*** 0.00205** 0.582*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00807) (0.00167) (0.00806) (0.000996) (0.0251) 
lr_pb_ij  -0.234***  -0.233***  -0.840*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0763)  (0.0807) 
       
Observations 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 
R-squared 0.908 0.361 0.904 0.361   
Hansen Test       
 
Standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, SGMM Estimated with Two Steps Estimator 
Note: lcust=ln(Customer of Private Banking); lta = ln(Total Assets); lgdpc = ln(GDP/capita), r_d_macro = deposit interest rate by central bank, 





Table 17. Estimation of Conjectural Variation Equation (1) According to General Risk 
 (64) (65) (66) 
 2SLS 3SLS SGMM 
VARIABLES lr_pb lcust lr_pb lcust xp xq 
       
lta -1.085***  -1.093***  -1.104***  
 (0.0389)  (0.0389)  (0.0334)  
lcust 1.713***  1.736***  1.685***  
 (0.0470)  (0.0469)  (0.0412)  
lgdpc 0.247***  0.252***  0.332***  
 (0.0514)  (0.0511)  (0.0474)  
r_d_macro 0.0985***  0.0996***  0.0848***  
 (0.0238)  (0.0237)  (0.0233)  
mc 0.000845 0.276*** -0.00254 0.276*** 0.00154 0.591*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00810) (0.00168) (0.00810) (0.000992) (0.0255) 
lr_pb_ij  -0.231***  -0.230***  -0.832*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.0764)  (0.0813) 
       
Observations 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 2,130 
R-squared 0.907 0.360 0.904 0.360   
Hansen Test       
Standard errors in parentheses : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, SGMM Estimated with Two Steps Estimator 
Note: lcust=ln(Customer of Private Banking); lta = ln(Total Assets); lgdpc = ln(GDP/capita), r_d_macro = deposit interest rate by central bank, 
lr_pb_ij (ln(r_i/r_j) = 𝜃𝑖𝑗.  
 
In each estimation of risk factors, it is confirmed that risk increased marginal cost and increase 
number of price of private banking. In demand equation the price difference terms (lr_pb_ij) 
associated with marginal cost as control variable of price difference decrease the quantity of private 
banking customer. This parameter confirm with our assumption that consumer will hold their 
private banking services along with risk mitigation preferences. The marginal cost properly 
reflected risk mitigation behavior of their investment. The terms demonstrates that increasing gap 
of price difference will reduce consumer due to increasing of risk.  
 
The estimation shows that Operational Risk as the highest indicators that consumer will avoid 
private banking services. Then followed by Credit Risk 3, Credit Risk 2, Credit Risk 1, Liquidity Risk 
and General Risk. These results suggest that consumer requires basic information whether the bank 
has good management in their daily operational live. Credit Risk in the second row, is inline with 
our previous results that Credit Risk 3 and Credit Risk 2 as a major causes whether bank 
conducting good management or bad management to tackle their risk.  
 
This statement confirmed as noted by Mishra and Meyer (2019) that private banking customer in 
emerging Asian is more risk appetite to increase their spread margin. The entire estimation from 
Table 12 – Table 17 shows that marginal risk that internalize risk significantly affect on number of 
customer on demand model. Increasing risk will increase price difference between bank and 
increase their marginal cost that led to decreasing their market power.  
 
These tables inform us that internalizing risk on cost model is the dominant factor that affect on 
demand for customer and price competition of private banking in Indonesia. The price of private 
banking sector is affect by macro indicators such as increasing of GDP percapita and interest rate 
imposed by central bank. Hence, we can stated that the central bank rate policy affect on the level of 
price of private banking. When the central bank increases the basis point interest rate, this will 





We incorporate the GMM parameters from Table 12 – Table 17 into equation (1) to measure 
Rotschild-Breshanan Index (CVI – Conjectural Variation Index). The competition index was 
produced according to  each risk hence we have five CVI with different risk type. We need to 
illustrates whether CVI within and between strategic group have different competition behavior. In 
order to decompose the competition anatomy according to bank cluster. We calculated within 
competition behavior by calculating separate average statistic of CVI into universal bank, foreign 
bank, local bank, and sharia bank according to average statistic of CVI in every cluster. We 
measured between strategic competition by calculating average statistic in the entire sample. We 
depicted this CVI in Figure 1. 
 
In Figure 1 between competition index is lower that within universal index, which means that the 
average of competition index in universal strategic group is higher than between group. Within 
universal group the competition is more fierce than national in average. This condition only apply 
within universal cluster than other cluster such foreign and local bank cluster. Whereas, sharia 
bank the competition higher than national average. In fact within group competition close to 
universal bank.  
 
Furthermore, we portrayed the performance within and between bank by applying response curve 
according to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) in the whole sample. We mapped the graph according to 
our results from GMM estimation in Table 12- Table 17. We retrieve predicted price of private 
banking and mapped into market curve. We produce fit line for average price of private banking in 
the entire sample period and produce average statistics. Moreover, we also produce average 
marginal cost according to our marginal cost estimation from total cost estimation from the entire 
sample period.  
 
We depicted these variables in Figure 2, thereby we can distinguished accurately how the within 
group and between group are mapped into one single graph. We mapped bank code and their 
cluster to evaluate whether there is difference within and between group. In order to evaluate this 
results we should refer the pattern of risk and efficiency for each banks. For detail information of 
this pattern please see in appendix. We produce the graph that measure cost efficiency and risk 
factors for each sample bank.  
 
In order to explain Figure 2, we can identified that incumbent firm dominate by larger banks (MND, 
BCA). If we looking at the performance of risk and efficiency in the Appendix. They enjoy low 
efficiency and bigger market share. The determinant of their market power based upon their risk 
management and cost efficiency. There is no significant retaliation of bank within universal (U) 
group, otherwise between strategic  group, foreign bank (F) such as STC and OCN attempt to enter 
universal strategic group. Within strategic group, the second layer of universal bank (PMT, MEG, 
BTN, BKP) unable to compete with the incumbent. They unable to shift or brought the customer of 
private banking while most of the customer loyal to larger bank. The foreign bank attempt to 
penetrate the market with competitive price, in fact some of them have their market segment 
although in some extent the market share less than major player in universal bank. The competitive 
price of foreign (F) bank (STC Bank) higher than universal bank price. The  price of private banking 
in foreign strategic group higher than universal strategic group.  The price in foreign bank has 
higher rate than universal bank with limited market share as conducted by STC, while others (CTB, 








Figure 1. Risk Factors and Response Curve According to Strategic Group Cluster 
  
Note: Sce 1: Internalizing Risk Factor 1 into Cost Function and Conjectural Model; Sce 2: Internalizing Risk Factor 2 into Cost Function and Conjectural Model; Sce 3: Internalizing Risk Factor 
3 into Cost Function and Conjectural Model; Sce 4: Internalizing Risk Factor 4 into Cost Function and Conjectural Model; Sce 5: Internalizing Risk Factor 5 into Cost Function and Conjectural 
Model; Sce 6: Internalizing Risk Factor 6 into Cost Function and Conjectural Model
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For local bank (L: BJB, JTM, SSL) , they creates different segment and promote local customer as 
their potential revenue for private banking. This is also works for sharia banking (MML, MDS, BNS) 
as well. If we looking at their efficiency performance and CVI sharia bank shaped with better 
performance rather than L and F banks. In the near future, sharia banking will attract more new 
customer along with better economic growth. If we looking at the estimation in Table 12-17, the 
growing of private bank customer will lead by rising of middle income class that indicates by 
increasing of income per capita.  
 
If we looking the entire results, the external factors is strongly affect on strategic act of bank.  Since 
we analyzed from risk and efficiency and conjectural model, every bank has heterogeneity 
performance. This differences affected by the external environment that face by the bank. We 
confirmed Bryane et al., (2015) argument that strategic cope of private banking in Indonesia similar 
with other Asian countries, that bank interactively cope with external environment by internalizing 
the risk through cost and affect on their price and output.  
 
Basically, the strategic group of private banking in Indonesia is under investment during period of 
sample. There is no dramatic change of private bank in Indonesia offer with strong innovation or 
based upon over investment strategy. Although there is a fierce competition between bank, but the 
strategic asymmetric rivalry act in the market is soft. The universal bank strategically act by 
delivering common value for their private banking customer. This act, has been deter by foreign 
bank to offer with higher price than universal bank. Other bank such as local and sharia banking 
they tend to creates their own value by delivering value added product for their customer. This 
strategies is difference with universal and foreign bank. The local and sharia bank intent do creates 
unique market segment and value than universal banks.  
 
Our  results also support Mishra and Meyer (2019) argument that competition of private banking 
system in Asian market shaped of a higher appetite for risk, fragmented market and focus on capital 
preservation rather than wealth accumulation. The competition of private banking in Indonesia is 
dominated by incumbent firm that face by foreign bank. Within strategic group, incumbent create 
barrier by its efficiency and long standing experience of loyal customer. The incumbent play fat cat 
strategy while others play with lean and hungry outlook due to their lack of resources and 
inefficient. This competition characteristic support the quiet life hypothesis as suggested by Farrell 
and Shapiro, (1988) and bad management hypothesis as noted by Berger and DeYoung, (1997). 
Every bank play strong asymmetric strategy. This represent by  different behavior between bank, 
neither adopt nor imitate for each bank face similar strategy for risk and cost efficiency.  
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According to our hypothesis, it is stated that bank size, risk and return as mobility barrier for 
entrant to incumbent market. If we looking at the results, the size is no longer important factor to 
compete in private banking sectors. In private banking sectors, switching cost and risk management 
is a significant factor that attract private banking customers. How competition of private banking 
price with other private bank price (switching cost) is significant factor that increase private bank 
customer. We called this effect as “private touch” of private banking services. When the bank be able 
to offer competitive price by managing it cost and risk, the private bank customer will increase 




At this sub section, we have an argument that private banking in Indonesia is inefficient due to 
market environment. The fierce competition between bank in private banking market have attract 
various asymmetric strategies for each bank to compensate risk and efficiency. Universal bank with 
bigger asset size have attracted customer and dominated private banking sectors. If we connect 
with Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) taxonomy, this private bank company are fat cat while others are 
lean and hungry look. The incumbent play soft investment due to their assets and market power 
and stimulate its competitor by lean and hungry look.  
 
The rivalry between private bank in Indonesia have different strategies to get market share, there is 
no adoption or imitation strategy of other bank to follow other banks. The banks are compete based 
upon their resources, and their market environment that shaped its performance. The asymmetric 
rivalry in each level of cluster is strongly asymmetric that indicates by risk and efficiency 
performance during period of observation. Its completely different with developed country case as 
noted by Más-Ruiz et al., (2014) for Spanish banking. The competition in Indonesia is fierce that 
requires specific strategies to be different with others. Every bank promotes to deliver different 
value to get different market segment. This strategies is advantage for the emergence of entrant 
bank to get new market segment that ensure is captive with less risk and cost.  
 
The incumbent banks creates its own barriers and produce relative cost of advantage to gain 
market power. Its indicates by universal bank such as MND and BCA, their stable path efficiency led 
to fat cat strategy with under investment behavior. The long development of market segment and 
experience have benefited this bank to get loyal customer and attract new customer in the market.  
 
The incumbent benefit their stability in the group and produce strong barrier for the entrant to 
enter the market. While the entrant penetrate the existing market, with under investment strategy 
they keep manage their risk to maintain their efficiency. The entrant unable to cope this strategy 
due to lack of resources improving their efficiency above the incumbent. Therefore, they act their 
strategies with lean and hungry look to enter the market either within or between strategic group.  
 
In between group, such as local bank or sharia bank, the risk is depend upon its market 
environment that distinguished their performance and others. If we compare with theoretical 
definition, whether this group can enter into universal strategic group. The local require more 
assets and huge investment as well as better managing in risk and efficiency above universal 
performance to enter universal strategic group. Consequently, we can argue that stability of group 





If we looking at the behavior with others group such as foreign bank, this group has performed 
differently and more fluctuated rather than universal group. Some of bank such as CMW, HNB, RAB, 
OCN in fact have performed more competitive than other in their group and strongly competitive 
with universal bank. Hence, we can stated that foreign bank actually compete with universal bank 
rather than local or sharia bank.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In terms of risk and efficiency for private banking in Indonesia, risk, efficiency and switching cost 
are crucial variable to attract private banking customer. The competition of private banking in 
Indonesia dominated by incumbent firm. The incumbent of private banking based has larger size 
and long standing experience that represent by its market size. The risk and efficiency evolved over 
time and enjoyed by incumbent with fat cat taxonomy. The incumbent has abundant resource that 
can survive in different structure switching cost without compensating it fixed cost. In order to 
penetrate the market, the entrant play lean and hungry strategy in different market segment within 
strategic group. Otherwise, the foreign bank strategic group as between group attempt to enter 
incumbent market with offering higher cost strategy as noted on Figure 2.  
 
Along with increasing of strong economic growth, every private bank targeted with different 
market segment. There is no significant investment of private banking strategy to attract more 
customer. The local and sharia banks has different private banking market. They will produce 
different market than  universal and foreign banks. We confirm that competition of private banking 
in Indonesia dominate by higher risk appetite, fragmented market and focus on capital preservation 
rather than wealth accumulation.  
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Appendix A: Derivation of Conjectural Variation Equilibria for Private Banking Sectors 
 
We have that each bank of i has profit (𝜋𝑖) with revenue (𝑟𝑖) and cost (𝑐𝑖), bank received their 
revenue with Price (𝑃𝑖) and Quantity (𝑄𝑖). Then firm performance of bank based upon   𝜋𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖  𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖 − 𝑐(𝑄𝑖) 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑐(𝑄𝑖) 
Applying first order condition we have 𝑃(𝑄𝑖) + 𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝜕𝑃𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖 +∑𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗 ⋅ 𝜕𝑃𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖 = 𝜕𝐶𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑖 ≠𝑗  
 
After separating 𝜕𝑃𝑖 / 𝜕𝑄𝑖 we have 𝑃(𝑄𝑖) + 𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝜕𝑃𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖 [1 +∑𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑛𝑖 ≠𝑗 ] = 𝜕𝐶𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖  
where 
∑𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑛𝑖 ≠𝑗 = [   




An linearizing into retaliation between i and j become ∑𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑛𝑖 ≠𝑗 = [𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗 + 𝜕𝑄𝑗𝜕𝑄𝑖] 
 
Therefore we have final conjectural variation equilibria  𝑃𝑖(𝑄𝑖) + 𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝜕𝑃𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖 [1 +∑𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑛𝑖 ≠𝑗 ] = 𝐶𝑖′ 
Where 𝐶𝑖′ = 𝜕𝐶𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖, 𝑃′ = 𝜕𝑃𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑖 and 𝜃 = 1 + ∑ 𝜕𝑄𝑖𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑛𝑖 ≠𝑗 , we can simplify  
 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑖′ ⋅ 𝜃𝑖𝑗′ = 𝐶𝑖′ …………………………(A1) 
 
or we can move others terms to the left hand side. 𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖′ − (𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑖′ ⋅ 𝜃𝑖𝑗′)………………………(A2) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑖′ is cost function for private banking sector , it is estimated with translog cost function; 𝑃𝑖′ 
is price of output such as private bank rate for each bank, 𝑄𝑖  is demand for private bank. 𝜃 is 
conjectural parameters.  
 
From equation (A2) we modified this equation into simultaneous demand and supply of private 
banking to get conjectural parameters as noted in equation (1). In order to get incorporate 
switching cost theory, we elaborated that  second terms of equation (𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑖′ ⋅ 𝜃𝑖𝑗′) with small 
modification.  
 
As we noted earlier that, we assumed that conjectural equation of A2 based upon consumer 
perspective, that  the number of customer of private banking in bank -I and bank – j, as the number 
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of consumer equal to demand for private banking of consumers preferences.  The consumer 
preferences are equal to the price that We can define that and conjectural parameters from 
customer perspectives of 𝜃𝑖𝑗 that quantity is a separable function of price change (Shepard’s 
Lemma) 
 𝜃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑄𝑖𝑄𝑗 = 𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑗 = 𝑈𝑖𝑈𝑗 =  𝜕(𝑝𝑖)𝜕(𝑝𝑗) = 𝜃𝑖𝑗 ……………………..(A3) 
 
Where 𝜃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗  , we can called as switching cost parameters.  Another definition in equation 
A2, because we defined that 𝑃 = 𝐶, we can defined that 
 𝑃𝑖′ = 𝐶𝑖′ 
 
Therefore we have revised equation (A2) become, 
 𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖′ − (𝑄𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝑖′ ⋅ 𝜃𝑖𝑗)…………………..(A4) 
 
Where Q is quantity of number private bank customer, and C’ is marginal cost and 𝜃 as switching 





Appendix B: Risk and Efficiency 
 
In order to connect between risk and efficiency  we follow Hughes and Mester (1998) by estimating 
cost function that incorporate multiple output as well as risk indicators into the model. We employ translog cost function as a workhorse for estimating C’ (marginal cost). The translog function 
consist of three simultaneously equations that is cost function, cost share, and financial capital.  
The cost function (B1) we define as follows, ln 𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼0 +∑𝑎𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖 +∑𝑎𝑗𝑗 ln𝑤𝑗 +12∑∑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑗𝑖 + 12∑∑𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln𝑤𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗𝑖+∑∑𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 + 𝑓𝑘 ln 𝑘 + 𝑓𝑞 ln 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑓𝜎 ln 𝜎 +12 𝑟𝑘𝑘 ln 𝑘 ⋅ ln 𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘𝑞 ln 𝑘 ⋅ ln 𝑞+ 𝑟𝑘𝜎 ln 𝑘 ln 𝜎 +12 𝑟𝑞𝑞 ln 𝑞 ⋅ ln 𝑞 + 𝑟𝑞𝜎 ln 𝑞 ⋅ ln 𝜎+ 12 𝑟𝜎𝜎 ln 𝜎 ln 𝜎 +∑ℎ𝑘𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑘 ln 𝑦𝑖 +∑ℎ𝑞𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑞 ln 𝑦𝑖 +∑ℎ𝜎𝑖𝑖 ln 𝜎 ln 𝑦𝑖+∑𝑡𝑘𝑗𝑖 ln 𝑘 ln𝑤𝑗 +∑𝑡𝑞𝑗𝑖 ln 𝑞 ln𝑤𝑗 +∑𝑡𝜎𝑗𝑖 ln 𝜎 ln𝑤𝑗 + 𝑏𝜔 ln𝜔 + 12𝑔𝜔𝜔 ln𝜔 ln𝜔+∑𝑔𝑗𝜔𝑖 ln𝑤𝑗 ln𝜔 +∑𝑑𝑗𝜔𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖 ln𝜔 + 𝑡𝑘𝜔 ln 𝑘 ln𝜔 + 𝑡𝑞𝜔 ln 𝑞 ln𝜔 + 𝑡𝜃𝜔 ln 𝑞 ln𝜔+ 𝜖 
 
The market share function (B2)  𝑆𝑗 = 𝑏𝑗 +∑𝑔𝑖𝑗 ln𝑤𝑖𝑖 +∑𝑑𝑖𝑗 ln 𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑘𝑗 ln 𝑘 + 𝑡𝑞𝑗 ln 𝑞 + 𝑡𝜃𝑗 ln 𝜃 + 𝑔𝜔𝑗 ln𝜔 + 𝜉𝑖 
  
The capital function (B3)  ln 𝑘 = 𝐴0 +∑𝐴𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖𝑖 +∑𝐵𝑗 ln𝑤𝑗𝑖 + 𝐵𝜔 ln𝜔 + 𝑅𝑞 ln 𝑞 + 𝑅𝜎 ln 𝜎 + 𝑅𝑚 ln𝑚 +∑𝑅𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣 
Where 𝐶𝑖 is cost variable, 𝑦𝑖  is output that consist of lending, deposit, private banking; 𝑤𝑗 is price of 
input, 𝜔 is bank specific risk-free rate of interest (Central Bank Rate), k is financial capital, q is 
quality; 𝜎 is risk, m is other revenue from interest; 𝑆𝑗 is cost share of output over  input; 𝜖,𝑣,𝜉 are 
normally distributed terms.   
 
The efficiency was estimated 𝑇𝐸𝑖 = exp (−(ln𝐶𝑖 − ln𝐶?̂?)) 
 
For complete of results of translog function estimation and cost efficiency we, presents in the 
following tables.  
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Table A. 1. Risk Factors 1, 2, 3 and Translog Cost Function 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Risk Factor 1 Risk Factor 2 Risk Factor 3 
VARIABLES frontier share1 share2 frontier share1 share2 frontier share1 share2 
          
pl 0.404*** -0.0400*** -0.0617*** 0.452*** -0.0482*** -0.0319* 0.550*** -0.0546*** -0.0266 
 (0.0789) (0.0102) (0.0198) (0.0758) (0.00923) (0.0193) (0.0727) (0.00869) (0.0185) 
pk -0.497** -0.0327*** -0.112*** -0.384* -0.0402*** -0.0887*** -0.279 -0.0438*** -0.0854*** 
 (0.201) (0.00638) (0.0121) (0.223) (0.00535) (0.0110) (0.220) (0.00504) (0.0105) 
prisk 0.303* 0.303* -0.976*** 0.141 0.141 -0.891 -0.180*** -0.180*** 0.215*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.293) (0.290) (0.290) (0.597) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0680) 
plpl2 -0.0400***   -0.0482***   -0.0546***   
 (0.0102)   (0.00923)   (0.00869)   
pkpk2 0.126***   0.0853***   0.0875***   
 (0.0179)   (0.0144)   (0.0148)   
crrisk2 -20.09**   -6.324   -1.051   
 (7.920)   (24.94)   (1.221)   
ly12 -0.127***   -0.0737**   -0.0783*   
 (0.0302)   (0.0337)   (0.0472)   
ly22 0.0631**   0.0203   0.0160   
 (0.0286)   (0.0319)   (0.0449)   
ly32 -0.0189***   -0.0186***   -0.0191***   
 (0.00566)   (0.00474)   (0.00500)   
plpk -0.0327***   -0.0402***   -0.0438***   
 (0.00638)   (0.00535)   (0.00504)   
ply1 0.141***   0.0889**   0.0935*   
 (0.0353)   (0.0405)   (0.0536)   
pky1 0.0659***   0.0455*   0.0259   
 (0.0204)   (0.0239)   (0.0236)   
risky1 0.786*   -0.913   0.0356   
 (0.444)   (1.286)   (0.186)   
ply2 -0.0667*   -0.0247   -0.0312   
 (0.0344)   (0.0396)   (0.0515)   
pky2 -0.0146   -0.0341   -0.0154   
 (0.0213)   (0.0233)   (0.0239)   
risky2 -1.516***   0.819   0.180   
 (0.497)   (1.436)   (0.215)   
ply3 0.0150**   0.0198***   0.0247***   
 (0.00639)   (0.00568)   (0.00538)   
pky3 0.0166   0.0495***   0.0474***   
 (0.0134)   (0.0114)   (0.0122)   
risky3 0.704***   0.131   -0.100   
 (0.191)   (0.569)   (0.0695)   
ly3  0.0150** 0.0160  0.0198*** 0.00218  0.0247*** -0.00629 
  (0.00639) (0.0123)  (0.00568) (0.0118)  (0.00538) (0.0113) 
Constant 4.501*** 0.404*** 1.141*** 4.065*** 0.452*** 0.905*** 3.174*** 0.550*** 0.866*** 
 (0.747) (0.0789) (0.151) (0.707) (0.0758) (0.158) (0.679) (0.0727) (0.154) 
Observations 108 108 108 105 105 105 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.944 0.354 0.505 0.955 0.374 0.450 0.951 0.467 0.496 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A. 2.The Effect of Risk Factor 4 on Translog Cost Function 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 Risk Factor 4 Risk Factor 5 Risk Factor 6 
VARIABLES frontier share1 share2 frontier share1 share2 frontier share1 share2 
          
pl 0.638*** -0.0590*** -0.00122 0.416*** -0.0548*** -0.0248 0.00536 -0.00443 0.0176 
 (0.0878) (0.00945) (0.0185) (0.0670) (0.00835) (0.0183) (0.0633) (0.00729) (0.0223) 
pk -0.0136 -0.0479*** -0.0679*** -0.483** -0.0452*** -0.0836*** -0.417 0.00307 -0.0564*** 
 (0.233) (0.00569) (0.0107) (0.223) (0.00484) (0.0104) (0.270) (0.00512) (0.0156) 
prisk -0.178*** -0.178*** 0.434*** 0.207*** 0.207*** -0.239*** 0.501*** 0.501*** 0.389*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0436) (0.0850) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0693) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.133) 
plpl2 -0.0590***   -0.0548***   -0.00443   
 (0.00945)   (0.00835)   (0.00729)   
pkpk2 0.0898***   0.0910***   0.0838***   
 (0.0138)   (0.0139)   (0.0154)   
crrisk2 -3.683**   -0.473   5.413***   
 (1.508)   (1.141)   (1.213)   
ly12 -0.0850   -0.0740   -0.104***   
 (0.0564)   (0.0467)   (0.0312)   
ly22 0.0336   0.0139   0.0435   
 (0.0518)   (0.0431)   (0.0299)   
ly32 -0.0210***   -0.0232***   0.00357   
 (0.00489)   (0.00443)   (0.00339)   
plpk -0.0479***   -0.0452***   0.00307   
 (0.00569)   (0.00484)   (0.00512)   
ply1 0.0766   0.0914   0.132***   
 (0.0665)   (0.0589)   (0.0392)   
pky1 0.0501**   0.0380*   -0.0171   
 (0.0229)   (0.0226)   (0.0234)   
risky1 0.640**   -0.257   -0.298*   
 (0.272)   (0.236)   (0.167)   
ply2 -0.0160   -0.0195   -0.0684*   
 (0.0641)   (0.0567)   (0.0385)   
pky2 -0.0562**   -0.00345   0.0197   
 (0.0229)   (0.0271)   (0.0225)   
risky2 -0.597**   -0.0602   0.373**   
 (0.248)   (0.242)   (0.186)   
ply3 0.0219***   0.0239***   0.00337   
 (0.00558)   (0.00512)   (0.00411)   
pky3 0.0519***   0.0385***   0.0137   
 (0.0111)   (0.0116)   (0.0132)   
risky3 0.0815   0.213***   -0.330***   
 (0.0567)   (0.0668)   (0.0660)   
ly3  0.0219*** -0.00795  0.0239*** -0.00674  0.00337 -0.0184 
  (0.00558) (0.0106)  (0.00512) (0.0112)  (0.00411) (0.0125) 
Constant 2.382*** 0.638*** 0.491*** 4.409*** 0.416*** 1.031*** 8.747*** 0.00536 0.489** 
 (0.818) (0.0878) (0.173) (0.640) (0.0670) (0.146) (0.521) (0.0633) (0.194) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.950 0.408 0.553 0.952 0.514 0.506 0.994 0.730 0.440 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A- 1. Cost Efficiency and Risk Factor 2 Period 2014 – 2018 across Banks Sample 
 
 
Figure A- 2. Cost Efficiency and Risk Factor 1 Period 2014 – 2018 across Banks Sample 
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Figure A- 3. Cost Efficiency and Risk Factor 3  Period 2014 – 2018 across Banks Sample 
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